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The basic objective of the foreign policy of North Korea is to communize Korea and the rest of the free world. One of the actual basic foreign policies employed for the achievement of that objective is the solidification of their anti-Western, especially anti-U.S. ties with countries in Africa and Asia.
The North Korean regime had tried their politial approach to various neutral countries, but their attempts ended for the most part in failure due to the close ties such countries have maintained with the West for centuries. Thus, North Korea has found itself having to resort to an economic approach in order to pave the way for the political approach. As a primary means to attain this objective, North Korea has endeavored to promote personnel exchanges, sendings a variety of missions to various neutral countries.
Especially, the expansion of the foreign relations of Communist China with countries in Southeast Asia since 1955 provided North Korea with an excellent opportunity to develop its foreign relations in Southeast Asia by capitalizing on the diplomatic channels of Communists China. It also provided an opportunity for North Korea to changes its uncompromisingly pro-Russian policy to the pluralistic foreign policy with the multilateral trend of international politics since 1957.
Thus, North Korea came to establish diplomatic relations with ten or so neutral countries through the diplomatic channels of Communist China, establishing its consulates-general or trade missions in those countries.
The growth of Communist China's influence in Southeast Asia eventually enabled North Korea to expand its diplomatic relations with neutral countries in Southeast Asia, and with the visit of Sukarno to North Korea, this diplomatic expansion move gained impetus.
After 1961, when the Sino-Soviet conflict climaxed, North Korea about-faced from Soviet to Communist China, for a series of Soviet foreign policies, such as the policy of co-existence with the United States, the reconcilation policy toward Yugoslavia, the siding with india in the Indo-China border disputes, and the compromising retreat from the Cuban scene, were decisively detrimental to the anti-U.S. line of the Kim Il-song regime, ultimately designed for the communication of South and North Korea. It was around that time North Korea requested the Soviet Union to provide military aid to North Korea. However, with this request rejected, the Workers Party of North Korea had to convene its fifth meeting of the fourth session of the Party's Central Committee in December 1962 to devise a proper measure to steer away from the difficult situation resulting from the discontinuance of Soviet aid.
However, as the diplomatic basis of Communist China became shaken and the neutralism of Afro-Asian countries losts its lustre, the diplomacy of North Korea toward Asia and Africa naturally suffered a great blow. The abortive coup d'etat in Indonesia in 1965 and the fall of Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah brought the Peking Pyongyang-Jakarta-Acera Axis to collapse.
Meanwhile, a series of unfavorable situations for North Korea-such as the aggravation of the Viet Nam War. The strengthening of Korea's anti-Communist ties with free Asian countries through the sending of its troops to Viet Nam, and the isolation of Communist China within the Communist bloc-made it inevitable for North Korea to retreat from its anti-U.S. and anti-Soviet line. In addition, the aggravation of its domestic economy forced North Korea to choose either ideology or national interests and it can be said that North Korea had a preference to national interests.
Be that as it may, it does not mean that North Korea aligned itself with Soviet revisionism. Rather, it intends to gain economic benefit from the Soviet Union on the one hand and attempts to expand its diplomatic relations with neutral countries in Asia and Africa again by capitalizing on the diplomatic channels of the Soviet Union on the other.
The characteristic phenomenon presented after North Korea's declaration of the so-called "Independence Line" is the solidification of its diplomacy toward neutral countries and the new device of its diplomatic polices toward Africa and the Middle East.
Thus, as we can see through the fact that North Korea concluded trade agreements with Burma, Cambodia and Pakistan last autumn, that it sent its goodwill enjoys to countries in Africa and Asia early this year and that it declared its support for the United Arab Republic at the time of the Middle East War, North Korea has been attempting to make economic and political advances in various neutral countries. In this attempt, North Korea places special emphasis on winning over them to its policy of Communist rule over the entire territory of Korea as well as to its so-called ant-imperialistic struggle.
Accordingly, international communism, which is the basic line of North Korea, and its strategic aspects are substantially different. The basic ideological struggle of North Korea against the West is identical with that of Communist China. However, under the present circumstances pro-chinese propensity of a pro-Russian propensity. This change would not mean an alteration of the basic line of North Korea against the West, but merely a strategic change. Therefore, it will be subject to further change.
The North Korean regime had tried their politial approach to various neutral countries, but their attempts ended for the most part in failure due to the close ties such countries have maintained with the West for centuries. Thus, North Korea has found itself having to resort to an economic approach in order to pave the way for the political approach. As a primary means to attain this objective, North Korea has endeavored to promote personnel exchanges, sendings a variety of missions to various neutral countries.
Especially, the expansion of the foreign relations of Communist China with countries in Southeast Asia since 1955 provided North Korea with an excellent opportunity to develop its foreign relations in Southeast Asia by capitalizing on the diplomatic channels of Communists China. It also provided an opportunity for North Korea to changes its uncompromisingly pro-Russian policy to the pluralistic foreign policy with the multilateral trend of international politics since 1957.
Thus, North Korea came to establish diplomatic relations with ten or so neutral countries through the diplomatic channels of Communist China, establishing its consulates-general or trade missions in those countries.
The growth of Communist China's influence in Southeast Asia eventually enabled North Korea to expand its diplomatic relations with neutral countries in Southeast Asia, and with the visit of Sukarno to North Korea, this diplomatic expansion move gained impetus.
After 1961, when the Sino-Soviet conflict climaxed, North Korea about-faced from Soviet to Communist China, for a series of Soviet foreign policies, such as the policy of co-existence with the United States, the reconcilation policy toward Yugoslavia, the siding with india in the Indo-China border disputes, and the compromising retreat from the Cuban scene, were decisively detrimental to the anti-U.S. line of the Kim Il-song regime, ultimately designed for the communication of South and North Korea. It was around that time North Korea requested the Soviet Union to provide military aid to North Korea. However, with this request rejected, the Workers Party of North Korea had to convene its fifth meeting of the fourth session of the Party's Central Committee in December 1962 to devise a proper measure to steer away from the difficult situation resulting from the discontinuance of Soviet aid.
However, as the diplomatic basis of Communist China became shaken and the neutralism of Afro-Asian countries losts its lustre, the diplomacy of North Korea toward Asia and Africa naturally suffered a great blow. The abortive coup d'etat in Indonesia in 1965 and the fall of Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah brought the Peking Pyongyang-Jakarta-Acera Axis to collapse.
Meanwhile, a series of unfavorable situations for North Korea-such as the aggravation of the Viet Nam War. The strengthening of Korea's anti-Communist ties with free Asian countries through the sending of its troops to Viet Nam, and the isolation of Communist China within the Communist bloc-made it inevitable for North Korea to retreat from its anti-U.S. and anti-Soviet line. In addition, the aggravation of its domestic economy forced North Korea to choose either ideology or national interests and it can be said that North Korea had a preference to national interests.
Be that as it may, it does not mean that North Korea aligned itself with Soviet revisionism. Rather, it intends to gain economic benefit from the Soviet Union on the one hand and attempts to expand its diplomatic relations with neutral countries in Asia and Africa again by capitalizing on the diplomatic channels of the Soviet Union on the other.
The characteristic phenomenon presented after North Korea's declaration of the so-called "Independence Line" is the solidification of its diplomacy toward neutral countries and the new device of its diplomatic polices toward Africa and the Middle East.
Thus, as we can see through the fact that North Korea concluded trade agreements with Burma, Cambodia and Pakistan last autumn, that it sent its goodwill enjoys to countries in Africa and Asia early this year and that it declared its support for the United Arab Republic at the time of the Middle East War, North Korea has been attempting to make economic and political advances in various neutral countries. In this attempt, North Korea places special emphasis on winning over them to its policy of Communist rule over the entire territory of Korea as well as to its so-called ant-imperialistic struggle.
Accordingly, international communism, which is the basic line of North Korea, and its strategic aspects are substantially different. The basic ideological struggle of North Korea against the West is identical with that of Communist China. However, under the present circumstances pro-chinese propensity of a pro-Russian propensity. This change would not mean an alteration of the basic line of North Korea against the West, but merely a strategic change. Therefore, it will be subject to further change.
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