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논문 기본 정보

자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
저널정보
고려대학교 일민국제관계연구원 국제관계연구 국제관계연구 2003년 여름호 제8권 제1호 (통권 제15호)
발행연도
2003.9
수록면
137 - 161 (25page)

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초록· 키워드

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Even though we are in the process of the so-called "six-party talks," the modality of dialogue among countries involved, this paper argues that the future of the North Korean nuclear crisis is still uncertain and rather pessimistic, because we have major obstacles to overcome. They are: (1) the high level of North Korea's intransigence; (2) the lack of consensus within the U.S. government; (3) South Korea's subtle position; (4) difficulties to achieve effective verification regime; and (5) Russia's uncertain role.
This paper sketches out three paths that North Korea would take in the process of negotiation: (1) the complete dismantling of the North Korean nuclear development program; (2) North Korea's continuous brinkmanship with nuclear ambiguity; and (3) the announcement of North Korea's nuclear status. This paper then identifies several different scenarios for each path.
The first path, the complete dismantling one, discerns three different scenarios: (1) North Korea's reluctance to reform and the continuation of conflict on the Korean peninsula in the post-dismantling stage; (2) the success of North Korea's economic reform and the peaceful coexistence of the two Koreas; and (3) the failure of North Korea's economic reform and regime collapse.
The second path, the continuous brinkmanship with nuclear ambiguity, is a similar one that North Korea has sustained for the last several years. Under this path, we can identify several scenarios. However, since North Korea has announced its nuclear status, albeit informally, in the three-party talks among the United States, China, and North Korea in Beijing in April, 2003, the situation seems to have entered into path three. Interestingly enough, the United States has not yet accepted it as it was. Thus, it is not clear whether the North Korean nuclear situation is still under this assumption.
The third path, the announcement of North Korea's nuclear status, has three different scenarios: (1) accepting it as a fait accompli by other states; (2) economic sanctions against North Korea; (3) military response against North Korea.
The major implications of this analysis are four-fold. First, it should be noted that there is no such scenario as the most desirable and feasible one at the same time among the above-mentioned scenarios. For the United States and South Korea, the most desirable scenario would be the second one in the first path. However, it would not be the most feasible one. For North Korea, the situation would be the same. Therefore, both parties need more realistic strategic judgment.
Second, sanctions, either economic or military, should not be excluded as an option to deal with this situation. In that case, North Korea would try to stay in the second path or go into the third path.
Third, for the Kim Jong Ill regime, the collapse scenario is still highly feasible. In order for the Kim regime to avoid the scenario, it has to rely on risk-taking, that is, "reform gamble," but not "nuclear gamble."
Fourth, during the last several years, China has played a constructive role in the North Korean nuclear question. China's future role is more crucial. It is necessary that China send stronger message to North Korea than before, that there would be no alternative except dismantling its nuclear program.
The pendulum of the North Korean nuclear issue has swung back from optimism to pessimism during the last 10 years. It seems now that the pendulum is somewhere at the middle point of this spectrum since we agreed to have the six-party talks. It remains to be seen, however, whether this mechanism of dialogue would eventually bring about peace and stability in this region, settling the issue and creating a new strategic environment on which every party would safely rely.

목차

Ⅰ. 벼랑끝전술 대 압박외교
Ⅱ. 북한의 선택: 10개의 시나리오
Ⅲ. 핵 모호성과 핵 보유 선언
Ⅳ. 위기의 미래
Ⅴ. 결론
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