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The effect of corporate governance on the asymmetric cost behavior : focusing on managers's ownership, foreign investors's ownership and institutional investors's ownership
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기업지배구조가 비대칭적인 원가행태에 미치는 영향 : 경영자지분율과 외국인투자자 및 기관투자자지분율을 중심으로

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Type
Academic journal
Author
Jeong-Ho Koo (성균관대학교)
Journal
Management Accounting Association of Korea KOREAN JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING RESEARCH Vol.11 No.1 KCI Accredited Journals
Published
2011.6
Pages
1 - 35 (35page)

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The effect of corporate governance on the asymmetric cost behavior : focusing on managers's ownership, foreign investors's ownership and institutional investors's ownership
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Abstract· Keywords

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The objective of our study is to examine whether there is a negative relation between the quality of corporate governance and the degree of cost stickiness. If the firms have effective control and monitor systems, the agency costs will reduce and corporate governance will restrain manager’s opportunistic incentives. We can expect that strong corporate governance is effective to mitigate the degree of cost stickiness.
The results of this paper are as follows. First, we find that corporate governance is effective to mitigate the degree of cost stickiness. Total Costs(TC) are less sticky for firms which have higher foreign investor’s ownership. Manufacturing Costs(MFC) are less anti-sticky for firms which have higher manager’s ownership. Also, Selling, General, and Administrative Costs(SGA) and Salaries/Wages Expenses (SWE) are less sticky for firms which have higher manager’s ownership.
Second, the firms which belong to the great company group show less sticky, and foreign investor’s ownership and institutional ownership who have monitor incentives decrease the degree of cost stickiness.
Finally, we find that cost stickiness increase more when free cash flow, growth and over-investment are high.
The results of this study provide empirical evidence upon how the quality of corporate governance can determine the degree of cost stickiness.

Contents

Ⅰ. 서론
Ⅱ. 선행연구 및 가설설정
Ⅲ. 연구설계
Ⅳ. 실증분석 결과
Ⅴ. 결론
참고문헌
Abstract

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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2013-325-000442310