지원사업
학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
커뮤니티
연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
초록· 키워드
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This paper examines how syndicate structure affects the risk premium of international loan. Syndicate structure is an organizational response to information asymmetry in the process of syndicate dealing. In a syndicated lending, the lead bank retains a fraction of the loan, but it acts as the intermediary between the borrower and the syndicate participants. Between the two competing hypotheses of this paper ? concentration hypothesis versus diversification hypothesis, most of the estimations support the diversification hypothesis. As the riskiness of borrowing firm increases, lead arrangers and participating banks share the loan amounts since participating banks may possess information through which they can assess the riskiness of the borrowing firm as accurate as the lead arrangers do.
목차
Ⅰ. 서론
Ⅱ. 기존문헌 및 신디케이트금융의 계약과정에 근거한 실증가설의 도출
Ⅲ. 자료 및 실증분석
Ⅳ. 결론
참고문헌
Abstract
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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2013-326-000656344