본 연구는 1986년 1월 1일부터 2006년 12월 31일까지 한국증권선물거래소의 유가증권시장에 상장된 기업을 대상으로 소유집중도와 배당정책간의 관계를 실증분석 하였으며, 주요한 분석결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 대주주지분율은 배당지급에 유의한 양(+)의 영향을 미치지만, 대주주간의 소유집중도는 배당지급에 유의한 음(-)의 영향을 미친다. 이러한 결과는 대주주들이 배당지급을 선호하지만, 대주주간의 소유집중도가 증가할수록 배당지급을 적게 하는 대신에 그들의 통제 하에 있는 기업자원에서 사적 이익을 추구한다는 Shleifer and Vishny(1986)의 가설과 일치한다. 둘째, 대주주지분율과 대주주간의 소유집중도는 영업이익률변화, 레버리지비율변화, 잉여현금 흐름비율변화와 같은 요인들과의 상호작용을 통해 배당증가결정에 영향을 미치고, 영업이익률 변화, 레버리지비율, 레버리지비율변화, 잉여현금흐름비율변화와 같은 요인들과의 상호작용을 통해 배당감소결정에 영향을 미친다. 셋째, 대주주지분율과 대주주간의 소유집중도는 M/B 비율, 레버리지비율, 영업이익률변화와 같은 요인들과의 상호작용을 통해 배당재개결정에 영향을 미치고, 레버리지비율, 영업이익률변화와 같은 요인들과의 상호작용을 통해 배당중단결정에 영향을 미친다. 결론적으로, 소유집중도는 한국증권시장에서 배당정책에 중요한 영향을 미친다고 할 수 있다. 소유집중도가 증가할수록 대주주와 소액주주간의 대리인 갈등은 악화되며, 그 결과 배당정책에 부정적인 영향을 미친다고 할 수 있다.
In this paper, we study empirically the relations between ownership concentration and dividend policy of firms listed on Korea Securities Market. The main results of this study can be summarized as follows; First, firms with large shareholders pay higher dividends, but firms with high ownership concentration pay lower dividends in proportion of operating earnings. This result supports the hypothesis proposed by Shleifer and Vishny(1986) that large shareholders can extract private benefits from corporate resources under their control at the expense of minority shareholders. Second, firms with large shareholders are more likely to increase dividends when change of profitability increases, when change of leverage increases, and when change of free cash flows increases, firms with high ownership concentration are more likely to increase dividends when change of profitability decrease, and when change of leverage increases. On the other hand, firms with large shareholders are less likely to increase dividends when change of profitability decreases, when change of leverage decreases, and when change of free cash flows increases, firms with high ownership concentration are less likely to increase dividends when leverage decreases, when change of profitability increase, and when change of leverage increases. This result indicates that large shareholders have a stronger preference for internal retaining of corporate resources and a lower concern for the interest of outside investors. Third, firms with large shareholders are more likely to initiate dividends when growth opportunities decrease, when leverage increases, and when change of profitability increases, firms with high ownership concentration are more likely to initiate dividends when growth opportunities increase, and when leverage decreases. On the other hand, firms with large shareholders are more likely to omit dividends when leverage increases, firms with high ownership concentration are more likely to omit dividends when leverage increases, and when change of profitability decreases. Conclusively, ownership concentration appears to have a critical impact on dividend policy in Korea Securities Market. Because agency conflicts between large and minority shareholders are mainly due to the presence of large shareholders, those conflicts are logically intensified. In contrast, firms with diffused ownership are more likely to balance between their various stakeholders.