지원사업
학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
커뮤니티
연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
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초록· 키워드
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This study is an attempt to analyze how the DPRK and U.S. perceived and reacted to the establishment of the yushin system in South Korea in 1972 using recently declassified documents from Eastern European countries and the United States.
Right before the yushin proclamation, South Korean officials held secret talks with North Korea to both explain the reasoning behind the proclamation of martial law for yushin and request understanding about this from North Korea in advance. In short, South Korean officials were concerned about the possibility of North Korea announcing the halt of North-South dialogue due to the yushin proclamation. Interestingly, however, was the fact that North Korea was also concerned that criticism it made toward the yushin proclamation would provide South Korea with the opportunity to end dialogue. In summary, the goals held by each side were different, but both North and South Korea did not desire the end of dialogue.
Meanwhile, while South Korean officials were sensitive to the reaction of North Korea toward the yushin proclamation and exerted enormous energy to obtain understanding from the North, far less effort was placed on obtaining understanding from the U.S. The reason South Korean officials displayed such different attitudes toward North Korea and the U.S. before the yushin proclamation was related to their judgement that while North Korea could halt dialogue in a display of unhappiness toward the yushin proclamation, discontent by the U.S. toward the proclamation would not lead to the weakening or repeal of the U.S. security commitment.
North Korea and the U.S. had made virtually similar, and relatively accurate, analyses on the motives of Park Chung Hee to establish yushin. North Korea believed that Park was using a strong revamp of the South Korean system in the form of yushin to monopolize North-South dialogue and establish an equal dialogue structure with the North by blocking demands voiced by the opposition to participate in North-South dialogue and North Korean attempts to support the opposition. The U.S. also believed that at a fundamental level the motive for the yushin proclamation was based on Park’s desire to strengthen domestic control and secure a high-level of freedom of movement and leadership in North-South dialogue. Both North Korea and the U.S. held negative and critical perceptions toward the establishment of the yushin system. Despite this, North Korea decided to refrain from criticizing the yushin proclamation and maintain silence under the belief that keeping the door open for dialogue was important to both isolate the Park Chung Hee government and strengthen the “capabilities of revolution” in South Korea. The U.S. also decided to maintain silence toward the yushin proclamation due to concerns that a hardline response to the proclamation would lead to a security vacuum on the Korean peninsula.
Right before the yushin proclamation, South Korean officials held secret talks with North Korea to both explain the reasoning behind the proclamation of martial law for yushin and request understanding about this from North Korea in advance. In short, South Korean officials were concerned about the possibility of North Korea announcing the halt of North-South dialogue due to the yushin proclamation. Interestingly, however, was the fact that North Korea was also concerned that criticism it made toward the yushin proclamation would provide South Korea with the opportunity to end dialogue. In summary, the goals held by each side were different, but both North and South Korea did not desire the end of dialogue.
Meanwhile, while South Korean officials were sensitive to the reaction of North Korea toward the yushin proclamation and exerted enormous energy to obtain understanding from the North, far less effort was placed on obtaining understanding from the U.S. The reason South Korean officials displayed such different attitudes toward North Korea and the U.S. before the yushin proclamation was related to their judgement that while North Korea could halt dialogue in a display of unhappiness toward the yushin proclamation, discontent by the U.S. toward the proclamation would not lead to the weakening or repeal of the U.S. security commitment.
North Korea and the U.S. had made virtually similar, and relatively accurate, analyses on the motives of Park Chung Hee to establish yushin. North Korea believed that Park was using a strong revamp of the South Korean system in the form of yushin to monopolize North-South dialogue and establish an equal dialogue structure with the North by blocking demands voiced by the opposition to participate in North-South dialogue and North Korean attempts to support the opposition. The U.S. also believed that at a fundamental level the motive for the yushin proclamation was based on Park’s desire to strengthen domestic control and secure a high-level of freedom of movement and leadership in North-South dialogue. Both North Korea and the U.S. held negative and critical perceptions toward the establishment of the yushin system. Despite this, North Korea decided to refrain from criticizing the yushin proclamation and maintain silence under the belief that keeping the door open for dialogue was important to both isolate the Park Chung Hee government and strengthen the “capabilities of revolution” in South Korea. The U.S. also decided to maintain silence toward the yushin proclamation due to concerns that a hardline response to the proclamation would lead to a security vacuum on the Korean peninsula.
목차
Ⅰ. 머리말
Ⅱ. 유신선포 전후 남한의 대북 및 대미 접촉
Ⅲ. 북한의 시각과 대응
Ⅳ. 미국의 시각과 대응
Ⅴ. 맺음말
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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2014-910-001280197