지원사업
학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
커뮤니티
연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
초록· 키워드
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Cumulative voting for corporation directors is a system intended to allow minority shareholders to elect some of the directors of their corporation. Representation on the board of directors is important because the board of directors manages the corporation and establishes its policies.
The other method of voting for directors is sometimes called “straight” voting. With straight voting, majority shareholders can usually elect all of the directors of their corporation, while the minority shareholders can elect none. In contrast, cumulative voting for directors is intended to allow minority shareholders to elect a number of directors which is in rough proportion to their voting strength
The original idea for cumulative voting came from political theories, where the ideal was that majority and minority electors should all be represented in proportion to their numbers. The first expression of those political ideas in corporation law was the 1870 Illinois Constitution. Although nearly half of all states once mandated cumulative voting in corporate elections, only five states do so now in USA.
Most nations have cumulative voting provisions which are “permissive” and not “mandatory,” meaning that the decision to use cumulative voting is made at the corporation level. Majority shareholders usually control this decision and thereby control the use of cumulative voting.
After the Korean Economic Crisis in late 1997, the Korean government has introduced a “permissive” cumulative voting in the Korean Commercial Code. The 2013 Amendment to the Korean Commercial Code attempts to adopt “mandatory” cumulative voting.
Critics say that “mandatory” cumulative voting can lead to divided boards. Directors should owe their allegiance not to “special-interest” shareholders, but to all shareholders. Corporations generally do not favor cumulative voting because it may provide dissidents with greater leverage. Realistically, the Korean Commercial Code should allow corporations to choose to “opt out” to such a provision.
The other method of voting for directors is sometimes called “straight” voting. With straight voting, majority shareholders can usually elect all of the directors of their corporation, while the minority shareholders can elect none. In contrast, cumulative voting for directors is intended to allow minority shareholders to elect a number of directors which is in rough proportion to their voting strength
The original idea for cumulative voting came from political theories, where the ideal was that majority and minority electors should all be represented in proportion to their numbers. The first expression of those political ideas in corporation law was the 1870 Illinois Constitution. Although nearly half of all states once mandated cumulative voting in corporate elections, only five states do so now in USA.
Most nations have cumulative voting provisions which are “permissive” and not “mandatory,” meaning that the decision to use cumulative voting is made at the corporation level. Majority shareholders usually control this decision and thereby control the use of cumulative voting.
After the Korean Economic Crisis in late 1997, the Korean government has introduced a “permissive” cumulative voting in the Korean Commercial Code. The 2013 Amendment to the Korean Commercial Code attempts to adopt “mandatory” cumulative voting.
Critics say that “mandatory” cumulative voting can lead to divided boards. Directors should owe their allegiance not to “special-interest” shareholders, but to all shareholders. Corporations generally do not favor cumulative voting because it may provide dissidents with greater leverage. Realistically, the Korean Commercial Code should allow corporations to choose to “opt out” to such a provision.
목차
Ⅰ. 서론
Ⅱ. 집중투표제도의 의의와 장ㆍ단점
Ⅲ. 입법례
Ⅳ. 현행 집중투표제도
Ⅴ. 이사와 감사위원회위원의 선출방식
Ⅵ. 집중투표제도의 의무화
Ⅶ. 결론
參考文獻
〈Abstract〉
참고문헌 (25)
참고문헌 신청
1. [단행본] - 崔埈璿 / 2013 / 會社法
2. [학술대회논문] - 고윤성 / 2005 / 소액주주 보호와 기업가치에 관한 연구-집중투표제를 중심으로- / 한국회계학회 학술대회 논문집
3. [학술지(정기간행물)] - 고윤성 / 2006 / 집중투표제 도입 기업의 특성과 기업가치에 관한 연구 / 기업가정신과 벤처연구 9 (2) : 113 ~ 149
4. [학술지(정기간행물)] - 권재열 / 2002 / 집중투표제의 강행규정화 논의에대한 비판적 검토 / 규제연구 11 (1) : 5 ~ 37
6. [인터넷자원] - 김정호 / / 집중투표제, 자율적 선택의 대상
2. [학술대회논문] - 고윤성 / 2005 / 소액주주 보호와 기업가치에 관한 연구-집중투표제를 중심으로- / 한국회계학회 학술대회 논문집
3. [학술지(정기간행물)] - 고윤성 / 2006 / 집중투표제 도입 기업의 특성과 기업가치에 관한 연구 / 기업가정신과 벤처연구 9 (2) : 113 ~ 149
4. [학술지(정기간행물)] - 권재열 / 2002 / 집중투표제의 강행규정화 논의에대한 비판적 검토 / 규제연구 11 (1) : 5 ~ 37
6. [인터넷자원] - 김정호 / / 집중투표제, 자율적 선택의 대상
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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2014-360-002751731