본 연구는 외환위기 이후 급격한 변화를 겪고 있는 국내 기업 풍토에서 대리인 이론의 적용 여부를 검증하고, 장기적인 가치 증진에 도움이 되는 한국적 기업 지배구조 모형을 도출하는 데에 목적이 있다. 이러한 목적의 달성을 위하여 저자는 소유의 집중도, 기관투자가 지분율, 외국인 지분율, 사외이사 비율 등의 기업 지배구조 변수를 도입하고, 이들 변수들이 단독 또는 상호 결합하여 균형투자에 어떠한 영향을 미치는 지를 분석했다. 저자의 중요한 가정 중 하나는 지배구조 구성 요소들은 단독으로 보다는 상호 결합하여 더 큰 효과를 발휘한다는 것이다. 399개 상장 기업을 대상으로 하여 실증 분석한 결과, 외국인 지분율, 사외이사 비율 등은 균형투자에 긍정적인 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 또한, 외국인 지분율과 사외이사 비율 상호작용 항과 외국인 지분율과 기관투자가 지분율 상호작용 항도 균형투자에 긍정적인 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 본 연구의 결과는 첫째, 사외이사와 외국인 투자가는 기업이 장기적 성과 향상을 담보하는 투자를 유도하는 역할을 한다는 것과 둘째, 기관투자가, 외국인 투자가, 사외이사 등은 상호 결합하여 경영자의 기회주의적 행동을 보다 효과적으로 억제한다는 것을 시사한다.본 연구의 결과는 경영자의 도덕적 해이 방지에 골몰하고 있는 기관투자가, 외국인 투자가 등의 주주는 물론 기업 지배구조와 관련된 정책 마련에 고심하고 있는 정책 당국, 소액주주 운동을 펼치고 있는 시민단체, 그리고 자신의 투자 행동 방향을 놓고 고민하는 경영자에게 유용한 지침을 제공할 것이다.
Despite the growing importance of corporate governance practices, information in the areas of corporate ownership and board practices is still scarce. This study fills the research gaps by examining the effects of corporate governance structure on balanced investments, arguing that the effective governance structure enhances the balanced investments. Agency theory suggests that investors need to be concerned with the scopes of investments because of the significant benefits and risks associated with these important decision-makings. Agency theory, also, suggests that the interests of shareholders and mangers are more aligned when there are large bolckholders. Also, prior research shows that the presence of large blockholders enhances long-term investments. Thus, I examine whether the large blockholders enhance the balanced investments. A company’s board is the primary internal corporate governance mechanism responsible for setting investment policy and monitoring managers. Especially, outside directors have both willingness and abilities to monitor managers’self-serving behaviors. Outside directors often already have expertise relevant to monitoring managers and are experts in evaluating investment risks. Therefore, a stronger outside directorship gives managers as well as shareholders confidence that a firm will invest appropriate areas and yield benefits to both of them. Hence, I examine whether outside directors on board enhance the balanced investments. In terms of the structure and balance of ownership, foreign investors are now increasingly controlling corporate equity. In Korea, foreign investors are largest owners of corporations and control about USD 250 billion in stocks. Corporate governance research suggests that foreign investors are increasingly resorting to activism to press their demands. Theorists argue that these activism constrain managerial opportunism related to investment decisions. Thus, I examine whether foreign investors enhance the balanced investments. High aggregate equity holdings both institutional investors and foreign investors create liquidity problem. The difficulty of exit provides these investors with the incentive to exercise voice to influence the level and mix of investments. This creates a mutual dependence. Foreign investors depend on institutional investors’expertises on Korean firms, while institutional investors depend on foreign investors’ownership stakes-based power. This mutual dependence creates an additional vehicle for monitoring firm’s investment decision-making. Hence, I expect a firm’s institutional investors may moderate the relationship between foreign investors and balanced investments: the relationship will be stronger for firms with higher percentage of institutional investors’stock ownership.In fact, in recent years foreign investors have taken a strong interest in the boards on the firms in which they hold ownership, as a means of monitoring and controlling the investment actions of these firms’managers. Foreign investors are likely to invest in firms with adequate representation on outside directors because agency costs will be lower, and thus expected returns will be higher. Therefore, I expect that the proportion of outside directors on board moderates the relationship between foreign investors stock ownership and balanced investments: the relationship will be stronger for firms with higher percentage of outside directors.I use archival data-399 samples from Korean listed companies- to investigate the effects of corporate governance structure. In this study, I introduced balanced scorecard perspective to evaluate managers’investment activities. The balanced scorecard supplements traditional financial measurers with criteria that measures performance from three additional perspectives- those of customers, internal business processes, and learning and growth. The findings show that large blockholders have U-shaped relationship with balanced investments. These findings are not consistent with well-known “the entrenchment preposition” asserting that the presence of super-large blockholders weakens firm’s long-term investments. I find that foreign stock ownership is positively related to balanced investments. The results demonstrate the importance of foreign investors to monitor self-serving behaviors of managers in a Korean context.The findings further show that the effects of foreign shareholders on balanced investments are much stronger when there is a higher proportion of institutional investors. These findings suggest that institutional investors are increasingly resorting to activism to press their demands, and their involvement in setting investment policy is more visible when foreign investors’stock ownership is high. Considering no distinct role of institutional investors in Korean market noted by previous studies, these findings make an important contribution to the governance literature.Lastly, the findings suggest that the effects of foreign shareholders on balanced investments are much strong when there is a higher proportion of outside directors on a main board. These findings suggest that a combination of outside directorship and foreigners’ownership provides a high level of scrutiny of the managers’opportunistic behaviors, while it enhances balanced investments. These findings are important, as past research has not considered the joint effects of foreign investors and outside directors on corporate investment activities.Overall, the findings of this study highlights the importance of the orchestration of ownership structure and board structure in securing the interests of shareholders. In the long term, the combined effects of governance mechanisms help contestability of control, critical in disciplining managers and giving them an opportunity to bring about much-needed investment.This study provides an extension of corporate governance researches by examining how ownership structure and board structure orchestrate for firm’s balanced investments. I argue that expanding the discussion of agency problem in setting investments policy to include balanced scorecard viewpoint provides a richer setting in which to explore the effects of corporate governance.