지원사업
학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
커뮤니티
연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
초록· 키워드
오류제보하기
The U.S. invaded Iraq in March 2003 out of the concerns for the possibility that it might deliver the WMDs to Al-Queda, a terrorist group responsible for 9/11 attacks. The U.S. forces employing a conventional military doctrine soon had to face serious strategic and operational challenges as the insurgent activities grew in Iraq. The lack of knowledge and preparation for counterinsurgency and stability operations was the main cause of the problems.
The situation began to improve since the mid 2007 and finally the U.S. was able to declare the official end of the Iraq War in December 2011, which had defined the last ten years since 9/11. This strategic outcome was the result of a military innovation which involved conceptual sophistication and institutional expansion of the doctrine of counterinsurgency and stability operations. Against this backdrop, the purpose of this study is to systematically examine the validity of internal or external military innovation theories with the case of the doctrinal innovation during the Iraq War.
The result of the study demonstrates that the external model for military innovation, rather than internal model, can better explain the process of military innovation in counterinsurgency occurred during the Iraq War. It shows that the military innovation during the Iraq was made possible because outside civilian leaders drove doctrinal overhaul by supporting the so-called mavericks that had innovation ideas and insights on counterinsurgency.
The suggestions this study makes are three-fold. First, the result of this study suggests that a military innovation requires an accumulation of academic and military knowledge on potential areas of innovation. Second, The Iraq case indicates that military innovations could be realized by adequate civilian control of the military. The civilian leadership needs to adjust with flexibility the scope and depth of intervention to military affairs so that the military functions effectively. Third, this study suggests that there could be many institutional hurdles to an effective response of the South Korea military when it comes to the instability in North Korea. It also necessitates continuous searches for policy options to facilitate doctrinal and behavioral changes in the South Korean military to deal with possible political instability and turmoil in North Korea.
The situation began to improve since the mid 2007 and finally the U.S. was able to declare the official end of the Iraq War in December 2011, which had defined the last ten years since 9/11. This strategic outcome was the result of a military innovation which involved conceptual sophistication and institutional expansion of the doctrine of counterinsurgency and stability operations. Against this backdrop, the purpose of this study is to systematically examine the validity of internal or external military innovation theories with the case of the doctrinal innovation during the Iraq War.
The result of the study demonstrates that the external model for military innovation, rather than internal model, can better explain the process of military innovation in counterinsurgency occurred during the Iraq War. It shows that the military innovation during the Iraq was made possible because outside civilian leaders drove doctrinal overhaul by supporting the so-called mavericks that had innovation ideas and insights on counterinsurgency.
The suggestions this study makes are three-fold. First, the result of this study suggests that a military innovation requires an accumulation of academic and military knowledge on potential areas of innovation. Second, The Iraq case indicates that military innovations could be realized by adequate civilian control of the military. The civilian leadership needs to adjust with flexibility the scope and depth of intervention to military affairs so that the military functions effectively. Third, this study suggests that there could be many institutional hurdles to an effective response of the South Korea military when it comes to the instability in North Korea. It also necessitates continuous searches for policy options to facilitate doctrinal and behavioral changes in the South Korean military to deal with possible political instability and turmoil in North Korea.
목차
1. 문제 제기
2. 군사혁신 이론과 연구가설
3. 변수의 조작화와 방법론적 논의
4. 사례연구 : 경험적 분석
5. 결론 및 함의
〈ABSTRACT〉
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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2016-390-001814242