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학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
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연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
초록· 키워드
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So far, causes of the Korean War have been mainly investigated both in the international politics and domestic politics. On the otherhand, the aspects of military strategies been researched. As Carl Von Clausewitz said, ‘War is a political means", causes of war should be discussed with political motives, but military strategic aspects are very important as well. It is difficult for a country to start a war without expecting ‘possibility of victory", no matter how attractive a political motive seems.
Possibility of victory can be calculated through both sides" military strategies. Therefore, this study aims to investigate the reasons why South Korea failed to deter North Korea"s invasion from the perspective of military strategy. Thus, this study examines both the attacker’s and defender"s military strategic advantages and disadvantages as well as the correlation between military strategies and war deterrence. Based on the findings, this study investigates the two Koreas" military buildup and military strategies before the Korean War, further analyzing the reasons why South Korea failed to repel North Korea"s invasion from the point of military strategy.
When it comes to North Korea"s military buildup and invasion plan between 1948 and 1950, North Korea had clear political and military objectives called ‘Unification under Communism" and adopted a blitzkrieg strategy to attain its objectives in the shortest period, and its military buildup was good enough to execute its blitzkrieg strategy.
When it comes to South Korea"s military buildup and defense plan, however, South Korea failed to establish an exact direction between its political and military objectives, which could be the defense against North Korea"s invasion and restoration of North Korean territory and even failed to establish a defense plan based on an attrition strategy which was likely to cope with North Korea"s blitzkrieg strategy most effectively. Moreover, South Korea didn"t properly pursue military buildup because of several restrictions.
In conclusion, North Korea"s possibility of victory became considerably higher from the point of military strategy in the early 1950s, which led to a circumstance that South Korea couldn"t deter North Korea"s invasion from a military strategic point of view as well as from the international political point of view.
Possibility of victory can be calculated through both sides" military strategies. Therefore, this study aims to investigate the reasons why South Korea failed to deter North Korea"s invasion from the perspective of military strategy. Thus, this study examines both the attacker’s and defender"s military strategic advantages and disadvantages as well as the correlation between military strategies and war deterrence. Based on the findings, this study investigates the two Koreas" military buildup and military strategies before the Korean War, further analyzing the reasons why South Korea failed to repel North Korea"s invasion from the point of military strategy.
When it comes to North Korea"s military buildup and invasion plan between 1948 and 1950, North Korea had clear political and military objectives called ‘Unification under Communism" and adopted a blitzkrieg strategy to attain its objectives in the shortest period, and its military buildup was good enough to execute its blitzkrieg strategy.
When it comes to South Korea"s military buildup and defense plan, however, South Korea failed to establish an exact direction between its political and military objectives, which could be the defense against North Korea"s invasion and restoration of North Korean territory and even failed to establish a defense plan based on an attrition strategy which was likely to cope with North Korea"s blitzkrieg strategy most effectively. Moreover, South Korea didn"t properly pursue military buildup because of several restrictions.
In conclusion, North Korea"s possibility of victory became considerably higher from the point of military strategy in the early 1950s, which led to a circumstance that South Korea couldn"t deter North Korea"s invasion from a military strategic point of view as well as from the international political point of view.
목차
1. 서론
2. 군사전략과 전쟁억제의 상관관계
3. 북한의 군사전략: 군사력 건설과 공격계획
4. 남한의 군사전략: 군사력 건설과 방어계획
5. 결론
〈ABSTRACT〉
참고문헌 (41)
참고문헌 신청
정병준 / 2006 / 한국전쟁 : 38도선 충돌과 전쟁의 형성 / 돌베게
Allan R. Millett / 2005 / The War of Korea, 1945∼1950: A House Burning / University of Kansas
Bruce Cumings / 2010 / The Korean War / Random House
Jack S. Levy / 1983 / Misperception and the Cause of War : Theoretical Linkagesand Anlytical Problems / World Politics 36(1):83~84
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita / 1989 / The Contribution of Expected Utility Theory to the Studyoff InternationalConflict, In The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars / Cambridge University Press :58~70
Allan R. Millett / 2005 / The War of Korea, 1945∼1950: A House Burning / University of Kansas
Bruce Cumings / 2010 / The Korean War / Random House
Jack S. Levy / 1983 / Misperception and the Cause of War : Theoretical Linkagesand Anlytical Problems / World Politics 36(1):83~84
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita / 1989 / The Contribution of Expected Utility Theory to the Studyoff InternationalConflict, In The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars / Cambridge University Press :58~70
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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2016-390-001814479