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학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
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We consider a two-sided many-to-one matching model where universities offer scholarships to students. We show that every stable matching rule is manipulable by a university via destroying and predonating endowments under a fairly wide class of scholarship rules. We also show that the student- and university-optimal matching rules are non-manipulable under the class of scholarship rule, where the universities give some of their endowments only to their most preferred student as scholarship. Furthermore, we show that the set of Nash equilibria of the destruction game and the set of stable matchings may be disjoint. We also show that there exists a stable allocation which is manipulable by a university via destroying as well as via predonating endowments whenever the scholarships are determined endogenously in the model.
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참고문헌 (18)
참고문헌 신청
?ris D. / 2011 / Manipulation via Endowments in University-Admission Problem / Economics Bulletin 31 : 2952 ~ 2958
?risD. andOzkal-Sanver, ?. / 2006 / Getting better students by offering a lower scholarships / Proceedings of the Workshop on Rationality and Knowledge : 60 ~ 65
Abdulkadiro?lu, A. / 2003 / School choice : A Mechanism Design Approach / American Economic Review 93 (3) : 729 ~ 747
Afacan, M. O. / 2013 / Application fee manipulations in two-sided matching markets / Journal of Mathematical Economics 49 (6) : 446 ~ 453
Atlamaz, M. / 2007 / Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible good / Social Choice and Welfare 28 (1) : 1 ~ 18
?risD. andOzkal-Sanver, ?. / 2006 / Getting better students by offering a lower scholarships / Proceedings of the Workshop on Rationality and Knowledge : 60 ~ 65
Abdulkadiro?lu, A. / 2003 / School choice : A Mechanism Design Approach / American Economic Review 93 (3) : 729 ~ 747
Afacan, M. O. / 2013 / Application fee manipulations in two-sided matching markets / Journal of Mathematical Economics 49 (6) : 446 ~ 453
Atlamaz, M. / 2007 / Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible good / Social Choice and Welfare 28 (1) : 1 ~ 18
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