The purpose of this thesis is to develop a understanding of
religious experience from a later Wittgenstein perspective. In oder to
develop this thesis, the deep epistemological dichotomy between
foundationalism and anti/non foundationalism is a central issue in
religious experience. As Richard Bernstein defines, foundationalism
means “the effort to achieve an undistorted contact between the
mirror of the mind and reality,” and anti/non foundationalism means
“the basic conviction that when we turn to the examination of those
concepts, we are forced to recognized that in the final analysis all
such rationality, truth, reality, right, the good, or norms must be as
relative to a specific conceptual scheme, theoretical framework,
paradigm, form of life, society or culture.”
Given these basic definitions of foundationalism and anti/non
foundationalism, the interpretations of religious experience can be
explained into two realms. One is that religious experience can be
understood as a inner or private experience of believer. This presupposes
religious experience as supernatural phenomenon. The other is
that religious experience can be understood as a rational or factual
phenomenon. This experience should be met the criteria of truthclaims, and thus all experience included religious experience should
be factual statements because of correspondent view of truth.
However, these two interpretations takes two epistemological stances
of foundationalism and anti/non foundationalism as insufficient
conditions of religious experience. In this reason, a later Wittgenstein
philosophy for developing religious experience can be considered as
a alternative way.
The religious experience of a later Wittgenstein perspective, which
rooted in anti/non foundational epistemology, discusses two meanings.
First, the later Wittgenstein philosophy defines religious experience
as the notion of cultural-linguistic discourse. In this discourse,
experience is not the primary element but culture or language
is the primary element. Second, the later Wittgenstein philosophy
means it as the notion of intratextuality. This implies that a priori text
determines our experience. As a result, the religious experience from
a later Wittgenstein perspective can be understood as a public, cultural
and linguistic. Therefore, the later Wittgenstein experience of
religion confirms that a priori experience of culture and language
determines religious experience.
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a understanding of
religious experience from a later Wittgenstein perspective. In oder to
develop this thesis, the deep epistemological dichotomy between
foundationalism and anti/non foundationalism is a central issue in
religious experience. As Richard Bernstein defines, foundationalism
means “the effort to achieve an undistorted contact between the
mirror of the mind and reality,” and anti/non foundationalism means
“the basic conviction that when we turn to the examination of those
concepts, we are forced to recognized that in the final analysis all
such rationality, truth, reality, right, the good, or norms must be as
relative to a specific conceptual scheme, theoretical framework,
paradigm, form of life, society or culture.”
Given these basic definitions of foundationalism and anti/non
foundationalism, the interpretations of religious experience can be
explained into two realms. One is that religious experience can be
understood as a inner or private experience of believer. This presupposes
religious experience as supernatural phenomenon. The other is
that religious experience can be understood as a rational or factual
phenomenon. This experience should be met the criteria of truthclaims, and thus all experience included religious experience should
be factual statements because of correspondent view of truth.
However, these two interpretations takes two epistemological stances
of foundationalism and anti/non foundationalism as insufficient
conditions of religious experience. In this reason, a later Wittgenstein
philosophy for developing religious experience can be considered as
a alternative way.
The religious experience of a later Wittgenstein perspective, which
rooted in anti/non foundational epistemology, discusses two meanings.
First, the later Wittgenstein philosophy defines religious experience
as the notion of cultural-linguistic discourse. In this discourse,
experience is not the primary element but culture or language
is the primary element. Second, the later Wittgenstein philosophy
means it as the notion of intratextuality. This implies that a priori text
determines our experience. As a result, the religious experience from
a later Wittgenstein perspective can be understood as a public, cultural
and linguistic. Therefore, the later Wittgenstein experience of
religion confirms that a priori experience of culture and language
determines religious experience.