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학술저널
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한국국방연구원 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 제30권 제2호
발행연도
2018.1
수록면
231 - 246 (16page)

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This paper seeks to find an answer to the question of why China’s effort to curb North Korea’s nuclear development has failed to produce expected outcomes. Since the second North Korean nuclear crisis in 2002, China, as the most, if not sole, influential country to North Korea, has been attempting to restrain the North’s nuclear armament. Nevertheless, Beijing has always failed to sustain its pressure on Pyongyang long enough to restrain Pyongyang’s nuclear ambition; instead, it has often ended up with China’s appeasement policy. Witnessing such failure, some scholars assert that Beijing is able, but not willing, to curb Pyongyang’s nuclear armament, while others claim that Beijing’s leverage over Pyongyang is a lot more limited than widely thought. Yet, both schools of thought, focusing narrowly on China’s capability or willingness to restrain North Korea, has failed to depict a full picture. By contrast, this study, employing a game theory approach, views Sino–DPRK relations as a strategic interaction between restrainer and restrainee. It argues that North Korea’s tactical deception and military adventurism shuffle China’s political priorities on the Korean peninsula, thereby preventing China from pressuring North Korea.

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