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학술저널
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한국국방연구원 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 제29권 제4호
발행연도
2017.1
수록면
513 - 531 (19page)

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North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear arms, and the U.S. effort to stop it, date back to the 1990s. In mid-1994, the United States was ready to use force—to launch a surgical strike with cruise missiles on the North Korean reprocessing facility at Yongbyon, which produces plutonium–the material for the nuclear bomb. At the last minute, North Korea’s leader Kim Il Sung invited former U.S. president Jimmy Carter to Pyongyang to salvage the crisis. Thereafter, the United States and North Korean officials met in Geneva and worked out a deal, the Agreed Framework, in December 1994, thereby Pyongyang agreed to suspend its plutonium program, while the United States, the ROK and Japan would build two light-water reactors for North Korea to generate electric power. The Americans find North Korean officials skillful in deception and duplicity, which is rather difficult to deal with. In spite of their public commitments, the North Koreans are determined to possess nuclear arms and find ways to continue their quest. They also excel in brinkmanship—they provoke and make trouble, and then extol concessions/rewards for cooperation. President Donald Trump, much like his predecessors, erroneously believes that China is willing and has the economic leverage and political influence to rein in Pyongyang’s leadership. Hence, Trump has tried to “outsource” North Korea’s nuclear threat to Chinese leader Xi Jinping in the wake of their summit meeting in April. Trump has offered a better trade deal to China, but Xi has been reluctant– to White House officials, Trump’s “bet” is not paying off. As the threat perception of China and the United States is different, and the interest and agenda of the two nations in the Asia–Pacific are also vastly different, Xi cannot be expected to do Trump’s bidding on North Korea. Xi’s primary concern is to prevent U.S. military attacks on North Korea that would result in the collapse of Kim Jong Un’s regime, and a pro-U.S. government in North Korea. Nor does Xi want to implement heavy sanctions on Pyongyang which could destabilize Kim’s regime and drive hundreds of thousands of refugees into China.

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