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학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
커뮤니티
연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
초록· 키워드
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To what extent can directors take the interests of other constituencies into account? Just because the directors have no legal obligation to take the other constituencies into account does not mean that the directors might not voluntarily do so. This raise the question of weather directors to take into account the interest of other constituencies at potential expense of the shareholders.
This problem as to State legislatures also reacted to the impact which corporate takeovers can have on other constituencies. Thirty-three states enacted provisions empowering directors, in making decision for the corporation, to take into account the interests of corporation's employees, customers, creditors, suppliers and the communities in which the company has facilities. Some statutes go beyond these obvious constituencies to allow directors to consider broader economic and social concerns.
For the most part, these statutes simply grant the directors discretion to consider these other constituencies; albeit, at least one state law requires the expressly grant members of these other constituencies a cause of action against directors who do not take the constituencies' interests into account.
The Delaware Supreme Court addressed the Question of weather directors breach their duty if they seek to prevent a corporate takeover in order to protect the interests of constituencies other than the shareholders. We shall have occasion to discuss these opinions in more detail when dealing with takeover defenses. The result of these opinions has been to leave Delaware law less than entirely clear. In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., the Delaware Supreme Court stated that, in deciding to oppose a takeover bid, the director could consider the impact of the bid on constituencies other than the shareholders. This includes, according to the court, creditors, employees, community. Nine month later, however, in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbs Holdings, Inc., the same court rejected the directors' other constituencies rational for favoring one takeover bid over another.
In this articles, Numerous states enacted provision of corporate constituencies in United Station shall propose adoption of directors' power provision 393 on Corporation Act in Korea.
This problem as to State legislatures also reacted to the impact which corporate takeovers can have on other constituencies. Thirty-three states enacted provisions empowering directors, in making decision for the corporation, to take into account the interests of corporation's employees, customers, creditors, suppliers and the communities in which the company has facilities. Some statutes go beyond these obvious constituencies to allow directors to consider broader economic and social concerns.
For the most part, these statutes simply grant the directors discretion to consider these other constituencies; albeit, at least one state law requires the expressly grant members of these other constituencies a cause of action against directors who do not take the constituencies' interests into account.
The Delaware Supreme Court addressed the Question of weather directors breach their duty if they seek to prevent a corporate takeover in order to protect the interests of constituencies other than the shareholders. We shall have occasion to discuss these opinions in more detail when dealing with takeover defenses. The result of these opinions has been to leave Delaware law less than entirely clear. In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., the Delaware Supreme Court stated that, in deciding to oppose a takeover bid, the director could consider the impact of the bid on constituencies other than the shareholders. This includes, according to the court, creditors, employees, community. Nine month later, however, in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbs Holdings, Inc., the same court rejected the directors' other constituencies rational for favoring one takeover bid over another.
In this articles, Numerous states enacted provision of corporate constituencies in United Station shall propose adoption of directors' power provision 393 on Corporation Act in Korea.
목차
1. 서설
2. 제정법상의 이해관계자규정
3. 판례법상 이해관계자규정의 운용실태
4. 이해관계자규정과 이사의 주의의무와의 관계
5. 결어
참고문헌
Abstract
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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2009-366-013796487