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자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
저널정보
한국영화학회 영화연구 영화연구 33호
발행연도
2007.9
수록면
469 - 503 (35page)

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The screen quota has reduced from the current 146 days(40%) to 73 days(20%) due to FTA(free trade agreement). The heated dispute in the Korea-America trade relations including BIT(bilateral investment treaty) has come to the end of a chapter. The reason that the dispute over the screen quota has remained unsolved for nearly 10 years is that America demanded that Korea should reduce or abolish the screen quota as a trade prerequisite when Korea asked America for an international trade agreement. If we apply this to Rober Putnam's theory on a two-level game, Korea didn't get ready for the reduction of the screen quota, and America had no alternative but to present the prerequisite in association with the ratification of the Congress. If we apply this to the win-set concept of the two-level game, the zone of possible agreement was not established so that it was impossible to reach an agreement, and that the win-set range of each side was extremely narrow. In other words, each of the two sides was too immersed in its own problems to come up with the best alternative to the negotiated agreement. In this context, Korea had to accept America's demand in a unilateral way without reaching an agreement with moviemen in the country. In conclusion, Korea was forced to accept the international win-set instead of the domestic win-set.
The fundamental reason for this lies in the difference in the mindsets and views between the Korean trade representatives and the American counterparts in relation with the screen quota system, Korean movies and American movies. The former tried to solve the problems with an economic logic, seeing that the screen quota system and movies would serve as a stumbling block in the stream of global trade and liberalism, whereas the latter stressed the importance of the value and meaning of mass culture including the Korean wave in the midst of depopularized global flow, or the invisible aspects of the movies in addition to the economic logic. In order words, they put more emphasis on the meaning beyond the movies than the media themselves. In this case, what are the Korean movies supposed to do in this fierce competition of the cultural battle field in Eastern Asia?
Another question is how America will keep the hegemony of the Hollywood films in that the country is preserving the established forces, though her cultural power is being decentralized. Now is the critical point where we are at a crossroad to determine whether Korea will play an active role as a cultural producer in the flow of denationalization and delocalization under the banner of Koreanization based on creolization or combination with America, or will be subjected to cultural supremacy by unilaterally consuming the Western cultural products. The solution doesn't consist in the screen quota system but in the abilities of men including their awareness, desire, policies and discourse, etc. relating to films and culture. In short, all these depend on Korean moviemen, the audience and political leaders.

목차

1. 들어가는 말
2. 국제협상과 양면게임
3. 국제협상과 스크린쿼터
4. 스크린쿼터 논란의 지형도 해독
5. FTA 협상과 양면게임 분석
6. 동아시아의 문화교류와 충돌
7. 결론
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