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- 자료유형
- 연구보고서
- 저자정보
- 발행연도
- 2006.3
- 수록면
- 2 - 2 (96page)
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The Council on East Asian Affairs(CEAA), launched in 2005 as a multinational membership-based, non-governmental organization under the sponsorship of the East Asia Foundation(EAF),* convened the first Korea-Russia CEAA Seminar on the topic of “Russia-Korea Cooperation for Peace and Prosperity in Northeast Asia.” The seminar was held on November 17, 2006 at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations(IMEMO) in Moscow.
Around forty participants, drawn from the political, business, media and academic sectors of both countries, discussed and exchanged views on issues of regional importance. The one day seminar consisted of three sessions, the first two of which dealt with Korea-Russia economic cooperation in regional and sectoral dimensions, respectively, while the last session was devoted to the topic of security cooperation in the regional context.
Session Summary
The first session assessed Korea-Russia bilateral economic relations in the context of Northeast Asian regional economic cooperation. Participants from both sides probed the ways in which bilateral cooperation between the two countries contributes to regional economic integration. Energy security was one of the issues that attracted the most attention of the participants.
? A Russian participant, in presenting his paper, made it clear that Russia had already begun to divert attention from Europe to Asia as its newly diversified oil and gas export markets. It was President Putin’s firm policy stance that energy pipelines should be extended to Russia’s Far East, and further to Northeast Asian countries. This should be done not only to facilitate development of East Siberia and the Far Eastern region, but also to avoid dependence on
Chinese and European markets.
? A Korean participant raised the issue of the lack of trilateral or multilateral cooperation between Korea, Japan and China, all of which share low energy self-sufficiency and high dependence on fossil fuels imported from the Middle East. The resurgence of Russia as a new energy power certainly creates a potential alternative source of energy for Northeast Asian countries, opening a horizon of multilateral energy cooperation. The presenter observed that there were some elements of uncertainty, however, that need to be properly addressed before the potential multilateral energy cooperation is realized. Firstly, no concrete progress has been made thus far in the construction of long-distance oil and gas pipelines to Russia’s Far Eastern region and to Northeast Asian countries. While financing of the pipeline projects, at an estimated cost of US$20-30 billon, is yet to be declared, there is some concern over whether there are sufficient energy resources in the region enough to make the projects economically viable. Secondly, Russia’s bilateral, rather than multilateral, approach to its development of energy resources is in fact amplifying (or even utilizing) competition and conflict between Northeast Asian countries, particularly between China and Japan. It is critical, the Korean presenter pointed out, that not only does Russia make sincere efforts to clarify these elements of uncertainty, but furthermore that it takes proactive initiative in building a regional energy security regime.
The second session narrowed the focus of discussion down to bilateral economic cooperation in specific sectors.
? A Korean participant presented on Korea-Russia economic cooperation in the automobile industry. He observed that Korean car companies did not maintain manufacturing facilities in Russia, supplying Russian markets with locally assembled products while Hyundai Motors, a Korean automobile manufacturer, took up a leading position in Russia’s imported car markets, selling ninety thousand cars a year. The presenter emphasized that Korean car companies aggressively increase investment in Russia both in local manufacturing and A/S networks. High-tech sectors such as hybrid cars were stressed in particular as one of the crucial realms of bilateral sectoral cooperation of the two countries.
? A Russian participant, in his presentation on the transportation complex in Siberia and Russia’s Far East, argued that connecting Russian transportation networks to Asia and Europe would facilitate not only Russia’s integration with the world economy, but also regional economic integration. He quoted three merits Russia would have in particular as a freight transport corridor linking Asia-Pacific and Europe. Firstly, Russia does not have to construct additional domestic routes since it already has vast transport networks that include TSR, North Sea routes and air transportation routes. Secondly, the single national legal and institutional infrastructure avoids conflicts that may arise when freight travels across multiple national borders. Thirdly, the Russian transportation system stretches through various Russian regions with abundant natural resources.
The subject of the third session was Korea-Russia security cooperation to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis through diplomacy, which could form the basis for a Northeast Asian regional security system.
? A Russian paper presenter argued that North Korea’s nuclear test in October 2006 had some consoling side-effects as it revealed North Korean nuclear capacity. Not only was the test considered a failure in technical terms, but it also showed that it would take at least three to four years for North Korea to complete nuclear warhead development. Regarding the UN resolution on the North Korean nuclear test, he proposed that its implementation should be properly and carefully combined with humanitarian aid from international organizations.
? A Korean presenter designated post-nuclear test North Korea not as a nuclear power, but as a “dangerous country with capacity to manufacture nuclear bombs.” Although North Korea possesses nuclear bombs and their carriers(missiles), he argued, the nuclear test turned out to be only a half-success at best. Moreover, North Korea still has a long way to go before it can develop bombs small enough to be loaded on missiles. Defying the argument that North Korea developed nuclear weapons in order to sell them on the black market, he listed four alternative explanations for the nuclear program: (1) as a means of nuclear deterrence against the United States; (2) as a bargaining chip for more economic aid; (3) to implement the state goal of “constructing a strong and prosperous nation”; and (4 )to compensate for losing a conventional arms race with South Korea.
? The third Russian participant made clear Russia’s position toward the North Korean nuclear issue: Russia opposes North Korean nuclear test since it has been lending firm and full support to the international principle of nuclear non-proliferation. As for resolving the crisis, he argued that the North Korean accounts at the Banco Delta Asia should be unfrozen before all else. This would revive the Six Party talk process, in the framework of which North Korean concessions on its nuclear weapons and facilities should be met with reciprocal rewards.
Discussions and Analysis
? In discussion sessions, some Korean participants expressed concerns about Russia’s utilizing its energy resources as foreign policy leverage. They specifically asked if its oil and gas pipeline policies were giving rise to competition and conflict, rather than cooperation, between and among the Northeast Asian countries. To these concerns, Russian participants replied Russia was simply adjusting its energy and pipeline policies to market principles with no intention of using them politically.
? Bringing up a pessimistic view on North Korea’s abandoning its nuclear program, a Korean participant raised a question about concrete measures to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis. A Russian participant pinpointed the failure of the NPT system to universalize the international principle of nuclear non-proliferation as it had responded softly to Indian and Pakistan nuclear possession. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003, he argued, turned out to have provoked those US-designated “axis of evil” countries to seek nuclear weapons to guard their security. In this context, he proposed that the Six Party talks positively reassess construction of nuclear power plants in North Korea in particular, and its energy problems in general. Another Russian participant opined that hard-line measures including military strikes on North Korean nuclear facilities were more likely to worsen, rather than solve, the crisis. A more desirable solution would be to engage North Korea in international society through a gradual and phased approach.
? The Korean and Russian economies are of complementary nature each other: The former has comparative advantage in such sectors as IT and industrial products, including consumer durables, while the latter has strength in natural resources and those sectors utilizing base science technologies. This is in sharp contrast to the Korean and Chinese economies, which are increasingly turning into a competitive relationship.
? Expressing concerns about its heavy reliance on natural resource sas its main exports, participants of both sides recommended Russia diversify its trade structure by enhancing and expanding bilateral economic ties with Korea, particularly in such sectors as science, technology and aeronautics.
? The development of energy resources and the construction of pipelines and trans-Russian transport networks in East Siberia and Russia’s Far East provide a crucial opportunity for Russia to more tightly integrate with Northeast Asian economies. This would be a great help in alleviating the severe depopulation problem in the region as well. It also provides an opportunity for Russia to diversify its energy export markets from Europe to Asia while permitting Northeast Asian countries to ease their heavy reliance on Middle Eastern oil.
? The recent shift in Russia’s foreign policy toward more assertiveness is due in no small part to changes in Russia’s domestic politics, as well as to rising prices in world energy markets. The strengthened power of the federal government, (at the expense of local governments and ‘oligarchs’), as well as political and economic stability under Putin’s leadership, has enabled Moscow to direct new attention to Asia. Russia, now identifying itself as a “Eurasian state,” associates the development of East Siberia and its Far Eastern region with economic cooperation and integration with the Asian economy.
? The principle of “multi-polarity,” or “multi-polar world order,” advocated by former Prime Minister Yevgenii Primakov since the mid-1990s, is now gaining fresh momentum in Moscow’s foreign policy. This sentiment was expressed through Russia’s initiative in launching such new regional organizations as CSTO(Collective Security Treaty Organization) and SCO(Shanghai Cooperation Organization) and its active participation in existing regional organizations and processes like APEC, ASEAN, ARF and the Six Party talks. Particularly notable is Russia’s attempt to ally with China and India to form a “strategic triangle” and check the US influence in the region.
? In this context, Moscow’s recent policy toward Asia concurs to a great extent with Seoul’s “Northeast Asian Peace and Prosperity Initiative,” under which great emphasis has been given to regional cooperation in finance, energy, logistics and transport. Regarding the relationship with Moscow in particular, Seoul endeavors (1) to secure stable energy supplies; (2) to provide incentives for Pyongyang via Moscow-Seoul-Pyongyang triangular economic cooperation; (3) to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue in a peaceful and diplomatic way; and (4) to develop the Six Party talk process eventually into a comprehensive Northeast Asian multilateral security system.
Policy Suggestions
Seminar participants agreed to suggest the following policy measures to the Seoul and Moscow governments that will contribute to deepening the “Mutually Trustful Comprehensive Partnership” between the two countries.
Economic Cooperation
Trade
? Based on the complementary nature of the two economies, Korea and Russia need to expand and diversify their bilateral trade. While Russia should diversify its trade structure from natural resources into space and aeronautics, Korean companies are encouraged to be more aggressive in their investment in Russia. There is great potential for a deepening of bilateral cooperation between the two countries particularly in the realm of commercializing Russia’s base science technologies.
Investment
? Russia currently occupies less than one percent of Korea’s total foreign direct investment, which is due in great part to Russia’s underdeveloped investment infrastructure. While Russia must devote intensive efforts to improve its legal and institutional infrastructure, Korea for its part needs to build up a systematic knowledge and information system on Russia for its business sector. Energy
?While Korea should take active part in the development of energy resources in East Siberia and Russia’s Far East, Russia should enhance transparency in its energy development and pipeline construction projects in order to ease concerns that Russia is utilizing its energy resources as a means of foreign policy leverage. Of particular importance is Russia’s proactive initiative and participation in building a multilateral energy cooperation regime in Northeast Asia.
Moscow-Pyongyang-Seoul Trilateral Cooperation
? Boundaries between economy and security are increasingly getting blurred in a newly emerging Northeast Asian regional order. Without resolving security concerns posed by the North Korean nuclear issue, it would be hardly possible to develop bilateral or multilateral cooperation over the development of Russia’s Far East.
? From this point of view it would be desirable to adopt an approach that combines security and economics, inducing North Korea to participate in Russia-Korea economic cooperation in developing Russia’s Far Eastern region and eventually making North Korea committed to regional security and prosperity. In particular, North Korea should be encouraged to take part in trilateral cooperation over such sectors as energy, electricity, railroads, forestry, agriculture and fishery in Russia’s Far East.
Security Cooperation
North Korean Nuclear Issue
? A military solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis is not acceptable to either South Korea or Russia. The UN Security Council resolution should be implemented sincerely, but it should not employ sanctions merely for the sake of sanctions, nor for the purpose of overthrowing the incumbent North Korean regime. Constructive sanctions should be aimed at resolving the issue in a peaceful and diplomatic way.
? Of critical importance here is the reciprocal and phased approach to the issue in the institutional framework of the Six Party talks. North Korea should be induced to freeze, disable, and eventually abandon its nuclear facilities and weapons in return for economic incentives and a security guaranty provided by the countries concerned.
Six Party Talks
? It is strongly recommended that Russia and South Korea cooperate closely to enhance the Six Party talk process. They should establish multiple substructures and channels, each of which would deal with a specific functional subject area such as North Korea-United States contacts, North-South Korean dialogues, trilateral economic cooperation, etc. The two countries should work towards leveraging this process into a multilateral security regime in Northeast Asia.
Around forty participants, drawn from the political, business, media and academic sectors of both countries, discussed and exchanged views on issues of regional importance. The one day seminar consisted of three sessions, the first two of which dealt with Korea-Russia economic cooperation in regional and sectoral dimensions, respectively, while the last session was devoted to the topic of security cooperation in the regional context.
Session Summary
The first session assessed Korea-Russia bilateral economic relations in the context of Northeast Asian regional economic cooperation. Participants from both sides probed the ways in which bilateral cooperation between the two countries contributes to regional economic integration. Energy security was one of the issues that attracted the most attention of the participants.
? A Russian participant, in presenting his paper, made it clear that Russia had already begun to divert attention from Europe to Asia as its newly diversified oil and gas export markets. It was President Putin’s firm policy stance that energy pipelines should be extended to Russia’s Far East, and further to Northeast Asian countries. This should be done not only to facilitate development of East Siberia and the Far Eastern region, but also to avoid dependence on
Chinese and European markets.
? A Korean participant raised the issue of the lack of trilateral or multilateral cooperation between Korea, Japan and China, all of which share low energy self-sufficiency and high dependence on fossil fuels imported from the Middle East. The resurgence of Russia as a new energy power certainly creates a potential alternative source of energy for Northeast Asian countries, opening a horizon of multilateral energy cooperation. The presenter observed that there were some elements of uncertainty, however, that need to be properly addressed before the potential multilateral energy cooperation is realized. Firstly, no concrete progress has been made thus far in the construction of long-distance oil and gas pipelines to Russia’s Far Eastern region and to Northeast Asian countries. While financing of the pipeline projects, at an estimated cost of US$20-30 billon, is yet to be declared, there is some concern over whether there are sufficient energy resources in the region enough to make the projects economically viable. Secondly, Russia’s bilateral, rather than multilateral, approach to its development of energy resources is in fact amplifying (or even utilizing) competition and conflict between Northeast Asian countries, particularly between China and Japan. It is critical, the Korean presenter pointed out, that not only does Russia make sincere efforts to clarify these elements of uncertainty, but furthermore that it takes proactive initiative in building a regional energy security regime.
The second session narrowed the focus of discussion down to bilateral economic cooperation in specific sectors.
? A Korean participant presented on Korea-Russia economic cooperation in the automobile industry. He observed that Korean car companies did not maintain manufacturing facilities in Russia, supplying Russian markets with locally assembled products while Hyundai Motors, a Korean automobile manufacturer, took up a leading position in Russia’s imported car markets, selling ninety thousand cars a year. The presenter emphasized that Korean car companies aggressively increase investment in Russia both in local manufacturing and A/S networks. High-tech sectors such as hybrid cars were stressed in particular as one of the crucial realms of bilateral sectoral cooperation of the two countries.
? A Russian participant, in his presentation on the transportation complex in Siberia and Russia’s Far East, argued that connecting Russian transportation networks to Asia and Europe would facilitate not only Russia’s integration with the world economy, but also regional economic integration. He quoted three merits Russia would have in particular as a freight transport corridor linking Asia-Pacific and Europe. Firstly, Russia does not have to construct additional domestic routes since it already has vast transport networks that include TSR, North Sea routes and air transportation routes. Secondly, the single national legal and institutional infrastructure avoids conflicts that may arise when freight travels across multiple national borders. Thirdly, the Russian transportation system stretches through various Russian regions with abundant natural resources.
The subject of the third session was Korea-Russia security cooperation to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis through diplomacy, which could form the basis for a Northeast Asian regional security system.
? A Russian paper presenter argued that North Korea’s nuclear test in October 2006 had some consoling side-effects as it revealed North Korean nuclear capacity. Not only was the test considered a failure in technical terms, but it also showed that it would take at least three to four years for North Korea to complete nuclear warhead development. Regarding the UN resolution on the North Korean nuclear test, he proposed that its implementation should be properly and carefully combined with humanitarian aid from international organizations.
? A Korean presenter designated post-nuclear test North Korea not as a nuclear power, but as a “dangerous country with capacity to manufacture nuclear bombs.” Although North Korea possesses nuclear bombs and their carriers(missiles), he argued, the nuclear test turned out to be only a half-success at best. Moreover, North Korea still has a long way to go before it can develop bombs small enough to be loaded on missiles. Defying the argument that North Korea developed nuclear weapons in order to sell them on the black market, he listed four alternative explanations for the nuclear program: (1) as a means of nuclear deterrence against the United States; (2) as a bargaining chip for more economic aid; (3) to implement the state goal of “constructing a strong and prosperous nation”; and (4 )to compensate for losing a conventional arms race with South Korea.
? The third Russian participant made clear Russia’s position toward the North Korean nuclear issue: Russia opposes North Korean nuclear test since it has been lending firm and full support to the international principle of nuclear non-proliferation. As for resolving the crisis, he argued that the North Korean accounts at the Banco Delta Asia should be unfrozen before all else. This would revive the Six Party talk process, in the framework of which North Korean concessions on its nuclear weapons and facilities should be met with reciprocal rewards.
Discussions and Analysis
? In discussion sessions, some Korean participants expressed concerns about Russia’s utilizing its energy resources as foreign policy leverage. They specifically asked if its oil and gas pipeline policies were giving rise to competition and conflict, rather than cooperation, between and among the Northeast Asian countries. To these concerns, Russian participants replied Russia was simply adjusting its energy and pipeline policies to market principles with no intention of using them politically.
? Bringing up a pessimistic view on North Korea’s abandoning its nuclear program, a Korean participant raised a question about concrete measures to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis. A Russian participant pinpointed the failure of the NPT system to universalize the international principle of nuclear non-proliferation as it had responded softly to Indian and Pakistan nuclear possession. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003, he argued, turned out to have provoked those US-designated “axis of evil” countries to seek nuclear weapons to guard their security. In this context, he proposed that the Six Party talks positively reassess construction of nuclear power plants in North Korea in particular, and its energy problems in general. Another Russian participant opined that hard-line measures including military strikes on North Korean nuclear facilities were more likely to worsen, rather than solve, the crisis. A more desirable solution would be to engage North Korea in international society through a gradual and phased approach.
? The Korean and Russian economies are of complementary nature each other: The former has comparative advantage in such sectors as IT and industrial products, including consumer durables, while the latter has strength in natural resources and those sectors utilizing base science technologies. This is in sharp contrast to the Korean and Chinese economies, which are increasingly turning into a competitive relationship.
? Expressing concerns about its heavy reliance on natural resource sas its main exports, participants of both sides recommended Russia diversify its trade structure by enhancing and expanding bilateral economic ties with Korea, particularly in such sectors as science, technology and aeronautics.
? The development of energy resources and the construction of pipelines and trans-Russian transport networks in East Siberia and Russia’s Far East provide a crucial opportunity for Russia to more tightly integrate with Northeast Asian economies. This would be a great help in alleviating the severe depopulation problem in the region as well. It also provides an opportunity for Russia to diversify its energy export markets from Europe to Asia while permitting Northeast Asian countries to ease their heavy reliance on Middle Eastern oil.
? The recent shift in Russia’s foreign policy toward more assertiveness is due in no small part to changes in Russia’s domestic politics, as well as to rising prices in world energy markets. The strengthened power of the federal government, (at the expense of local governments and ‘oligarchs’), as well as political and economic stability under Putin’s leadership, has enabled Moscow to direct new attention to Asia. Russia, now identifying itself as a “Eurasian state,” associates the development of East Siberia and its Far Eastern region with economic cooperation and integration with the Asian economy.
? The principle of “multi-polarity,” or “multi-polar world order,” advocated by former Prime Minister Yevgenii Primakov since the mid-1990s, is now gaining fresh momentum in Moscow’s foreign policy. This sentiment was expressed through Russia’s initiative in launching such new regional organizations as CSTO(Collective Security Treaty Organization) and SCO(Shanghai Cooperation Organization) and its active participation in existing regional organizations and processes like APEC, ASEAN, ARF and the Six Party talks. Particularly notable is Russia’s attempt to ally with China and India to form a “strategic triangle” and check the US influence in the region.
? In this context, Moscow’s recent policy toward Asia concurs to a great extent with Seoul’s “Northeast Asian Peace and Prosperity Initiative,” under which great emphasis has been given to regional cooperation in finance, energy, logistics and transport. Regarding the relationship with Moscow in particular, Seoul endeavors (1) to secure stable energy supplies; (2) to provide incentives for Pyongyang via Moscow-Seoul-Pyongyang triangular economic cooperation; (3) to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue in a peaceful and diplomatic way; and (4) to develop the Six Party talk process eventually into a comprehensive Northeast Asian multilateral security system.
Policy Suggestions
Seminar participants agreed to suggest the following policy measures to the Seoul and Moscow governments that will contribute to deepening the “Mutually Trustful Comprehensive Partnership” between the two countries.
Economic Cooperation
Trade
? Based on the complementary nature of the two economies, Korea and Russia need to expand and diversify their bilateral trade. While Russia should diversify its trade structure from natural resources into space and aeronautics, Korean companies are encouraged to be more aggressive in their investment in Russia. There is great potential for a deepening of bilateral cooperation between the two countries particularly in the realm of commercializing Russia’s base science technologies.
Investment
? Russia currently occupies less than one percent of Korea’s total foreign direct investment, which is due in great part to Russia’s underdeveloped investment infrastructure. While Russia must devote intensive efforts to improve its legal and institutional infrastructure, Korea for its part needs to build up a systematic knowledge and information system on Russia for its business sector. Energy
?While Korea should take active part in the development of energy resources in East Siberia and Russia’s Far East, Russia should enhance transparency in its energy development and pipeline construction projects in order to ease concerns that Russia is utilizing its energy resources as a means of foreign policy leverage. Of particular importance is Russia’s proactive initiative and participation in building a multilateral energy cooperation regime in Northeast Asia.
Moscow-Pyongyang-Seoul Trilateral Cooperation
? Boundaries between economy and security are increasingly getting blurred in a newly emerging Northeast Asian regional order. Without resolving security concerns posed by the North Korean nuclear issue, it would be hardly possible to develop bilateral or multilateral cooperation over the development of Russia’s Far East.
? From this point of view it would be desirable to adopt an approach that combines security and economics, inducing North Korea to participate in Russia-Korea economic cooperation in developing Russia’s Far Eastern region and eventually making North Korea committed to regional security and prosperity. In particular, North Korea should be encouraged to take part in trilateral cooperation over such sectors as energy, electricity, railroads, forestry, agriculture and fishery in Russia’s Far East.
Security Cooperation
North Korean Nuclear Issue
? A military solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis is not acceptable to either South Korea or Russia. The UN Security Council resolution should be implemented sincerely, but it should not employ sanctions merely for the sake of sanctions, nor for the purpose of overthrowing the incumbent North Korean regime. Constructive sanctions should be aimed at resolving the issue in a peaceful and diplomatic way.
? Of critical importance here is the reciprocal and phased approach to the issue in the institutional framework of the Six Party talks. North Korea should be induced to freeze, disable, and eventually abandon its nuclear facilities and weapons in return for economic incentives and a security guaranty provided by the countries concerned.
Six Party Talks
? It is strongly recommended that Russia and South Korea cooperate closely to enhance the Six Party talk process. They should establish multiple substructures and channels, each of which would deal with a specific functional subject area such as North Korea-United States contacts, North-South Korean dialogues, trilateral economic cooperation, etc. The two countries should work towards leveraging this process into a multilateral security regime in Northeast Asia.
목차
Executive Summary
서문(Введение)
1. 동아시아협의회 한러세미나 개요(Краткий обзор российско-корейского семинара Совета по делам Восточной Азии)
2. 각 세션의 논점 및 내용 요약(Резюме предметы обсуждения и содержание)
3. 종합평가와 분석(Обобщение оценка и анализ)
4. 한러 협력 심화 확대를 위한 정책과제(Политические мероприятия направленные на углубление и - расширение российско корейского сотрудничества)
참석자 명단(List of Participants and Observers)
러시아어 번역문
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