This article discusses U.S.-South Korean relations, focusing on the changing policy positions of both the U.S. and South Korean governments. It argues that the sacrifices made by the U.S. Army cannot be underestimated despite conflicting views on its role in the preservation of security on the Korean peninsula. The author points out the fact that South Korea has been able to become one of the most affluent states in the modem world since the U.S.' security guarantee began with the Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953. The U.S.' security commitment towards South Korea has been pivotal in deterring North Korea from attempting a second invasion. The existence of the U.S.-South Korean Alliance System, in the eyes of North Korean leaders, shifted the military strategic center of gravity from the Korean peninsula to Washington, D.C.. Likewise, Washington is geographically located beyond North Korea's distance of fire. Conversely, North Korea's military strategic center of gravity is located within the United States' distance of fire. In this situation, North Korean leaders' strategic policy priority is the complete withdrawal of the U.S. military from South Korea as this will make more uncertain the automatic intervention of the U.S. forces into possible conflicts on the Korean peninsula. North Korea's demand for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea is a two-pronged strategy in that, on the one hand, the withdrawal will lead to the dissolution of the UN Command and, on the other hand, the dissolution will damage the legal and political rationale for the United States' operational control of the Korean Army which was originally transferred to the UN Command. U.S. policy changes with regard to its forces in South Korea began to occur with the Nixon Doctrine in July 1969. According to the Nixon Doctrine, each alliance state should take primary responsibility for its own defense while the United States observes defense treaty and provides a nuclear umbrella in case of the threat of nuclear attack on an alliance state. In addition, the United States, according to the Doctrine, will only provide adequate military and economic aid when an alliance state is attacked by other means. Naturally, the Nixon Doctrine led to the reduction and withdrawal of the U.S. forces stationed in South Korea and the South Korean government clearly objected to this doctrine. In accordance with this doctrine, U.S. government implemented the withdrawal of 20,000 troops from South Korea. This withdrawal created 'a sense of distrust' among the South Korean people despite the additional aid amounting to 150,000,000 dollars for modernizing the South Korean military. This trust crisis reached its highest point when the Carter administration unilaterally announced the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea over 4-5 years. However, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea was indefinitely suspended due to strong opposition from U.S. Congressmen and military leaders. At the time of the suspension, the end of 1978, President Carter had withdrawn only 3,600 troops. Later, in January 1980 President Carter himself declared the Carter Doctrine which purported a strengthened armament against the Soviet Union. Following him, President Reagan made it clear that he never wanted the withdrawal of the U.S. military from the Korean peninsula. Nevertheless, in the post-Cold War period, there began to arise a symptom of change within U.S. citizens regarding the U.S. military stationed in South Korea. For example, Selig S. Harrison argues that the U.S., by shifting its role to that of an honest broker, should encourage a federal system on the Korean peninsula and gradually withdraw the U.S. military over a period of about ten years. Harrison emphasizes that it is high time to consider American national interests prior to the one-sided maintenance of the U.S.-South Korea alliance. On the other hand, South Korea began to develop expanded national interests based on the interests of the entire Korean nation instead of its past sole focus on the security interests of South Korea. South Korea's critical view on the U.S.' role began with the sudden reduction of US military during President Park's regime and the alleged U.S, permission for the deployment of an airborne special combat unit into the democracy movement-stricken city of Kwangju in May of 1980. Nevertheless, the author points out that the U.S. suffered collateral damage in relation to the Kwangju Massacre. Besides, it is suggested that the U.S. contributed to the democratization of the South Korean political system by pressuring the Chundoowhan regime following the Massacre. In the 1990s, South Korea began to be interested in the unequal relationship with the U.S. as it was admitted into the OECD. In particular, the Nogun-ri Massacre during the Korean War, the unequal SOFA, the recent death of two middle school girls after being hit by U.S. Army armored vehicles, and other issues are on the agenda. If these problems take place frequently, they might have a potential to develop into a national wrath. Moreover, the heightened pride and self-esteem of South Korean people tends to foster their intolerant attitude toward the existing inequality and unfairness in their relationship with the U.S. However, South Korean people should be prudent in demanding hasty withdrawal of the U.S. military from the Korean peninsula as such a rash approach may lead to a kind of "twilight divorce," not a brief mid-life crisis,' in the South Korea-U.S, relationship.
AI 요약
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1. 서론: 주한미군의 패러독스 2. 북한의 집요한 주한미군 철수 요구: 철저한 전력적 행동 3. 주한미군과 미국인의 인식변화: 민주주의의 아킬레스건 4. 주한미군과 한국인의 인식변화: 강대국 신드롬과 민족의식 5. 한국안보의 기본: 역사의 교훈과 비극의 감각 6. 결론 [ABSTRACT]