지원사업
학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
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연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
초록· 키워드
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In this paper, we develop theoretical game models to determine the level of government subsidies for banks to provide policy loans to innovative SMEs(small and medium sized enterprises) through banks, which otherwise would not finance them for the sake of their own profitability. For this, we compare net cash flows of each bank using different strategies against high risk innovative SMEs. A bank can decide whether to provide them loans or not in each period. Following Kim(2003)'s infinite horizon model on the soft budget constraint, we introduce a situation in which banks compete against each other for higher net long-term payoffs from their loans to innovative SMEs and non-innovative SMEs.
From the models, we show that competition among banks in general leads to a tighter decision against innovative SMEs, as a Nash equilibrium. It is not because the government bank is simply loose in providing loans, but because competition among commercial banks for fewer riskier borrowers results in tighter loan decisions against innovative SMEs. Thus, the competitive market for policy loans to innonvative SMEs fails to reach the socially optimal level of loans for innovative SMEs.
Commercial banks in the competitive market may require additional supports from the government to make UP for the differences in their payoffs to support innovative SMEs, possibly much riskier due to moral hazards and poor discounted cash flows. The monopolistic government bank might also request such supports from the government to fund otherwise unqualified SMEs. We calculate an optimal level of governmental support for banks to guarantee funding such high-risk innovative SMEs over periods without deviating from their optimal Nash equilibrium policies.
From the models, we show that competition among banks in general leads to a tighter decision against innovative SMEs, as a Nash equilibrium. It is not because the government bank is simply loose in providing loans, but because competition among commercial banks for fewer riskier borrowers results in tighter loan decisions against innovative SMEs. Thus, the competitive market for policy loans to innonvative SMEs fails to reach the socially optimal level of loans for innovative SMEs.
Commercial banks in the competitive market may require additional supports from the government to make UP for the differences in their payoffs to support innovative SMEs, possibly much riskier due to moral hazards and poor discounted cash flows. The monopolistic government bank might also request such supports from the government to fund otherwise unqualified SMEs. We calculate an optimal level of governmental support for banks to guarantee funding such high-risk innovative SMEs over periods without deviating from their optimal Nash equilibrium policies.
목차
Abstract
1. 서론
2. 선행연구
3. 모형
4. 결론 및 시사점
참고문헌
참고문헌 (33)
참고문헌 신청
1. [학술지(정기간행물)] - 강종구 / 2006 / 중소기업 정책금융지원 효과 분석 / 금융경제연구 (250)
2. [학술지(정기간행물)] - 김석진 / 2003 / 소상공인 신용보증제도의 개선방안 / 중소기업연구 25 (1) : 135 ~ 156
3. [학술지(정기간행물)] - 김석진 / 2007 / 관계금융이 자금가용성과 차입금리에 미치는 영향 / Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies 36 (1) : 1 ~ 32
4. [학술지(정기간행물)] - 김성환 / 2007 / 금융기관의 불량고객관리 전략 연구 : 구전 및 경쟁의 효과 / 경영학연구 36 (5) : 1313 ~ 1327
5. [단행본] - 김영배 / 2005 / 혁신형 중소기업 / 과학기술정책연구원
2. [학술지(정기간행물)] - 김석진 / 2003 / 소상공인 신용보증제도의 개선방안 / 중소기업연구 25 (1) : 135 ~ 156
3. [학술지(정기간행물)] - 김석진 / 2007 / 관계금융이 자금가용성과 차입금리에 미치는 영향 / Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies 36 (1) : 1 ~ 32
4. [학술지(정기간행물)] - 김성환 / 2007 / 금융기관의 불량고객관리 전략 연구 : 구전 및 경쟁의 효과 / 경영학연구 36 (5) : 1313 ~ 1327
5. [단행본] - 김영배 / 2005 / 혁신형 중소기업 / 과학기술정책연구원
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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2009-325-018483233