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자료유형
학술대회자료
저자정보
저널정보
한국무역학회 한국무역학회 국제학술대회 2003년도 한국무역학회 국제학술발표대회 發表論文集
발행연도
2003.10
수록면
315 - 317 (23page)

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The bargaining model of host governments-MNEs is accepted by many international business researches. It is currently accepted paradigm of host governments-MNEs relation in international business. Previous studies investigation the effectiveness of investment incentives have concluded that they have little impact on the location of foreign direct investment. However, too many kinds of incentives may have prevented researchers from determining their effects. Thus, the preferences of particular incentives is the fact that relevance may depend upon the specific situation of the foreign investors. It may be a function of many factors such as size, labor intensity, or investment objectives.
Host Governments-MNEs Relations
1) MNEs bargaining power resources
- technology
- size
- export potential
The bargaining power sources of MNEs can be derived from finn specific advantages such as technology, capital, size, export potential.
2) Host country bargaining power resources
- Size-population
- GDP
- Growth
- Per capital income
- technological/ managerial capacity
On the other hand, the bargaining power resources can be drawn from size-population and growth.
3) MNEs bargaining power constraints
- Industry competition(Concentration)
4) Host country bargaining power constraints
- Political instability
- FDI
- Internationalization
This paper investigated an important issue of relationship between FDI negotiation and incentive policy in a rapidly changing economy, Korea. Many countries have offered various investment incentive to attract foreign direct investment.
I explored how incentive preference of foreign companies in Korea is affected by the relative bargaining power between Korean government and foreign companies. The bargaining power model of bringing two main perspectives in bargaining literature (bargaining power resources and constraints) into one framework was developed and tested with data from a survey of multinational firms subsidiaries in Korea.
Data Collection and Methodology
Data about the bargaining relationship between host government and SMEs were collected from a survey of foreign SMEs in Korea. The companies were selected from the KOFA (Korea Foreign Firm Association) and KOTRA (Korea Trade Promotion Corporation). Approximately 140 questionnaires of 500 firms actually responded. (Table 1 details the characteristics of sample surveyed).
Hypothesis
Based on review of previous studies, we developed several hypotheses.
The findings show that
(1) Incentives preferred by export firms will differ from those of local market firms.
(2) Large investors will prefer different incentives than those preferred by smaller investors.
(3) Incentives preferred by foreign firms will differ from year to year.
(4) Incentives preferred by foreign firms depend on how many countries they are considered enter into.
(5) Incentives preferred by foreign firms depend on how attractive they are considered host country.
Conclusion
Many country offered various investment incentives to attract foreign firms. In spite of these efforts, simply providing a wide variety of incentives to foreign firms is not effective policy. This findings showed that all incentives do not equally affect to all foreign firms. That is, the incentive preference of foreign firms depends on many variables such is size, type of investment, year of investment.
That the level of incentive is determined on the basis of incentive preferences of foreign firms imply that host governments are using scarce resources efficiently to attract foreign investment based on efficient policy from the high skills of government officials.

목차

ABSTRACT
Ⅰ. 서론
Ⅱ. 이론적 배경
Ⅲ. 연구가설 및 방법
Ⅳ. 연구의 분석결과
Ⅴ. 결론 및 시사점
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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2010-326-002421261