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This paper deals with the notorious question whether the conclusion of deliberation, in Aristotle, is action or not. I am, through the study on what Aristotle wants to mean by the technical term ‘prohairesis’, providing an answer to the question just mentioned. It is not very controversial that, in Aristotle, prohairesis is what we get as an outcome of deliberation (bouleusis) or practical thought (dianoia praktike), and that the conclusion of deliberation is a combination between reason (nous) and desire (orexis). However, what always baffles commentators is the question regarding what Aristotle means by the statement that the conclusion of deliberation is the combination of the desiderative and the conceptual elements of the soul.
Scholars such as Elizabeth Anscombe (1965), Norman Dahl (1984), and Martha Nussbaum (1978) have argued that the result is an action, thinking that the relationship between reason and desire is here of such a nature that prohairesis becomes an actual action.
I disagree with this conclusion. For, such a reason-desire combination itself ? albeit true for the nature of deliberation ? cannot let Aristotle’s deliberation be a thought in which there is a substantial force needed to initiate an action, but also, does Aristotle not employ the term ‘prohairesis’ to mean that which actually initiates action. I argue that when Aristotle mentions such a combined nature of prohairesis, he means to say no more than that the prohairesis is the conclusion of deliberation in which reason and desire have already been brought together. My claim is the following: prohairesis results from a reason-desire combination only in the sense that it is a part of a deliberation that already contains both a conceptual and a desiderative element. Hence, the thesis of our opponents that the combination of reason and desire is the nature of what enables prohairesis to be an action, is unacceptable. Consequently, I provide an alternative explanation on prohairesis. I argue that it is not an action itself, but a decision and a combination of the best comprehension (nous-element) of what to do and the correct intention (orexis-element) that follows from it.
Scholars such as Elizabeth Anscombe (1965), Norman Dahl (1984), and Martha Nussbaum (1978) have argued that the result is an action, thinking that the relationship between reason and desire is here of such a nature that prohairesis becomes an actual action.
I disagree with this conclusion. For, such a reason-desire combination itself ? albeit true for the nature of deliberation ? cannot let Aristotle’s deliberation be a thought in which there is a substantial force needed to initiate an action, but also, does Aristotle not employ the term ‘prohairesis’ to mean that which actually initiates action. I argue that when Aristotle mentions such a combined nature of prohairesis, he means to say no more than that the prohairesis is the conclusion of deliberation in which reason and desire have already been brought together. My claim is the following: prohairesis results from a reason-desire combination only in the sense that it is a part of a deliberation that already contains both a conceptual and a desiderative element. Hence, the thesis of our opponents that the combination of reason and desire is the nature of what enables prohairesis to be an action, is unacceptable. Consequently, I provide an alternative explanation on prohairesis. I argue that it is not an action itself, but a decision and a combination of the best comprehension (nous-element) of what to do and the correct intention (orexis-element) that follows from it.
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참고문헌 (19)
참고문헌 신청
1. [학술지(정기간행물)] - Anscombe, G. E. M. / 1977 / Thought and Action in Aristotle / Articles on Aristotle 2 : 61 ~ 71
2. [단행본] - Audi, R. / 2006 / 1 Aristotle on practical reasoning and the structure of action, In Practical Reasoning and Ethical Decision / Routledge : 22 ~ 40
3. [단행본] - Barnes, J. / 1991 / the Complete Works of Aristotle / Princeton University Press
4. [단행본] - Broadie, S. / 1991 / Ethics with Aristotle / Oxford University Press
5. [단행본] - Broadie, S / 2002 / Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Translation, Introduction, and Commentary / Oxford University Press
2. [단행본] - Audi, R. / 2006 / 1 Aristotle on practical reasoning and the structure of action, In Practical Reasoning and Ethical Decision / Routledge : 22 ~ 40
3. [단행본] - Barnes, J. / 1991 / the Complete Works of Aristotle / Princeton University Press
4. [단행본] - Broadie, S. / 1991 / Ethics with Aristotle / Oxford University Press
5. [단행본] - Broadie, S / 2002 / Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Translation, Introduction, and Commentary / Oxford University Press
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