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자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
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한국무역연구원 무역연구 무역연구 제14권 제6호
발행연도
2018.1
수록면
45 - 61 (17page)

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This paper examines how the ownership of firm insiders like employees and executives and exports resulting from globalization around IPOs serves as a signal to the Chinese IPO market to control asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders. Specifically, we test certain hypotheses including the compensation hypothesis and the information asymmetry hypothesis with respect to insider ownership, and the adverse asymmetric information hypothesis and the globalization effect with respect to exports. This was done using1,370 IPO firms that went public through the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges from 2003 to 2015. We found that the initial returns and long-term returns are lower for firms with both more employee ownership and exports, than those without or lower before IPOs. However, long-term CARs were higher for firms with larger executive stock ownership around the IPOs, but lower in intial returns. Firms with more exports given larger executive stock ownership performed better for some period of time after IPO while those given larger employee stock ownership performed better in the long run. Our results basically contradict the results of most prior studies for the case of ESOPs and exports, by rejecting insider motives on performance and their better compensation with higher return. They are partially consistent with the information asymmetry hypothesis which expects lower initial returns and higher long-term returns.

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