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논문 기본 정보

자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
송승종 (대전대학교)
저널정보
미래군사학회 한국군사학논총 한국군사학논총 제6권 제2호
발행연도
2017.12
수록면
3 - 31 (29page)
DOI
10.34166/rokms.2017.6.2.3

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The two successive ICBM-class of Hwasong-14 missile tests in July 2017, combined with what the North Korea claimed “hydrogen bomb test” marked a watershed moment signalling the advent of new and ominous era in the history of nuclear development and denuclearization. Graham Allison, a renowned Harvard University professor, described the North Korean nuclear missile problem as “a Cuban missile crisis in slow motion.” The purpose of this essay is to examine the origin of the North Korea’s nuclear missile crisis whose beginning can be traced back to the failed ‘Joint Declaration on The Denuclearization of The Korean Peninsula’ in 1991 within the context of ‘the Second Nuclear Age’, review the dynamic change that the North Korean crisis has brought upon the U.S. and North Korea in terms of strategic calculus, and to undertake in-depth analysis regarding the potential problems that are underneath the theory and practice in the traditional extended deterrence strategy of the U.S. The single most important question to be raised with respect to the research purpose is “Why are majority of South Koreans becoming increasingly nervous in the face of mounting threats from the North despite the rock-solid nature of ROK-US alliance system and the extended nuclear deterrence in the form of nuclear umbrella, that are promised, assured and reassured repeatedly?” The findings of this study revealed potential problems both in the theory and the practice of traditional deterrence strategy. Most of all, from the theory side, as evidenced by the Prospect Theory, the success and failure of deterrence can be reversed when the assumption of rationality is undermined. In addition, Danilovic’s dynamic extended deterrence model identified the existence of 'gray area' which has been in the blind spot which proved to be difficult to capture by means of typical dichotomous success or failure. The examination of the practice in the extended deterrence strategy, especially (1) de Gaulle’s Doubts, (2) a ‘leaky’ U.S. Umbrella, and (3) Healey’s Theorem, strongly implies the inevitable existence of structural gap between the extended deterrence that the U.S. believes to be sufficient to resolve the security threats against the allies, and that the allies perceive to be sufficient to counter the same threats. In short, the root cause of crisis posed by the North Korea is stemming from the Kim Jong-un regime’s anomalous and detrimental nuclear monopoly in the Korean peninsula. It seems that the resolution of the ongoing crisis would be virtually impossible unless the strategic nuclear unbalance due to the North Korea's nuclear monopoly is not addressed in due course. For that purpose, it is time for the ROK and the U.S. to transform the security paradigm in a dramatic manner. For instance, two allies must understand and accept the fact that the nuclear burden-sharing such as the reintroduction of tactical (or non-strategic) nuclear weapons into the Korean soil is not mutually exclusive but complementary with denuclearization policy.

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