지원사업
학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
커뮤니티
연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
초록· 키워드
오류제보하기
The disposal of treasury stocks which were held by the target corporation has been occasionally used to defend hostile takeover because the target can increase the friendly shareholders by choosing the purchaser of the treasury stocks and reduce the interest of the corporate bidder at the same time. The effect of the disposal is similar to the stock issuance in order to defend hostile takeover. In Republic of Korea, issuing new stocks to a third party while excluding existing shareholders is prohibited unless the target company can establish that it has a business purpose to justify the new issuance. In most cases, the issuances of the stocks during the takeover battle have been enjoined or struck down by court because they could not show they had qualifying business purpose.
However, there is no restriction of the disposal of treasury stocks on the sale to a third party. That is, the company can dispose of the treasury stocks to whomever it wants without the limitation of the business purpose. Regarding the similarity between the disposal and stock issuance, they might argue that the procedure and the limitation of the stock issuance should be applied to the disposal of treasury stocks, because the disposal could encroach the proportional right of the existing shareholders of the target corporation.
The rule of the stock issuance is, however, inapplicable to the disposal of treasury stocks even if the disposal of treasury stocks has much in common with the stock issuance in that the disposal can influence the right of the existing shareholders. First, the statute regarding the disposal of treasury stocks is not supposed to regulate the procedure of the disposal except the timing of the disposal. The aim of the statute is quite different from that of the stock issuance. Second, the disposal is not deemed to be capital transaction like the stock issuance because the capital stock will not be changed by the disposal. It is only a transaction affecting the net asset of the company like ordinary transaction recognizing revenues and expenses. On the other hand, the capital stock account will be directly influenced by the stock issuance. Therefore, the disposal of treasury stocks is not consistent with the comprehensive devices such as the protection of the existing shareholders which plays the important role in the capital transaction like the stock issuance. Third, there are other applicable remedies for existing shareholders if the disposal is done by the breach of director's duty. Therefore, even if we do not borrow the rule of the stock issuance to deal with the problems that would be caused by the disposal of treasury stocks, the result would not be irrational to the existing shareholders of the target.
Though the disposal of treasury stock is not deemed illegal per se, the general requirement for defensive tactics against hostile takeover should be considered if the disposal plan is adopted as a defensive measure of the target corporation. Therefore, judicial scrutiny on defensive action will determine whether the disposal of treasury stock is admitted or not. In general, the target board have the power to oppose a takeover bid if the board fulfilled the fiduciary duty in maximizing the interest of the target corporation and its shareholders. The criteria to decide whether the board fulfilled its duty are the nature and the scheme of the bid, the effect on the target company and its shareholders and the nature of the defense. Generally, the disposal of the treasury stocks would be considered an excessive measure because it tends to thwart the takeover bid totally. However, if there are additional conditions such as coercive bidding or destructive scheme of the takeover, the disposal would not be considered violation of the fiduciary duty.
However, there is no restriction of the disposal of treasury stocks on the sale to a third party. That is, the company can dispose of the treasury stocks to whomever it wants without the limitation of the business purpose. Regarding the similarity between the disposal and stock issuance, they might argue that the procedure and the limitation of the stock issuance should be applied to the disposal of treasury stocks, because the disposal could encroach the proportional right of the existing shareholders of the target corporation.
The rule of the stock issuance is, however, inapplicable to the disposal of treasury stocks even if the disposal of treasury stocks has much in common with the stock issuance in that the disposal can influence the right of the existing shareholders. First, the statute regarding the disposal of treasury stocks is not supposed to regulate the procedure of the disposal except the timing of the disposal. The aim of the statute is quite different from that of the stock issuance. Second, the disposal is not deemed to be capital transaction like the stock issuance because the capital stock will not be changed by the disposal. It is only a transaction affecting the net asset of the company like ordinary transaction recognizing revenues and expenses. On the other hand, the capital stock account will be directly influenced by the stock issuance. Therefore, the disposal of treasury stocks is not consistent with the comprehensive devices such as the protection of the existing shareholders which plays the important role in the capital transaction like the stock issuance. Third, there are other applicable remedies for existing shareholders if the disposal is done by the breach of director's duty. Therefore, even if we do not borrow the rule of the stock issuance to deal with the problems that would be caused by the disposal of treasury stocks, the result would not be irrational to the existing shareholders of the target.
Though the disposal of treasury stock is not deemed illegal per se, the general requirement for defensive tactics against hostile takeover should be considered if the disposal plan is adopted as a defensive measure of the target corporation. Therefore, judicial scrutiny on defensive action will determine whether the disposal of treasury stock is admitted or not. In general, the target board have the power to oppose a takeover bid if the board fulfilled the fiduciary duty in maximizing the interest of the target corporation and its shareholders. The criteria to decide whether the board fulfilled its duty are the nature and the scheme of the bid, the effect on the target company and its shareholders and the nature of the defense. Generally, the disposal of the treasury stocks would be considered an excessive measure because it tends to thwart the takeover bid totally. However, if there are additional conditions such as coercive bidding or destructive scheme of the takeover, the disposal would not be considered violation of the fiduciary duty.
목차
Ⅰ. 문제의 제기
Ⅱ. 자기주식의 취득 및 처분에 관한 제한
Ⅲ. 경영권 방어 목적의 제3자 배정 신주발행에 관한 법령 및 판례이론
Ⅳ. 신주발행 규정의 유추적용 여부
Ⅴ. 경영권 방어행위에 관한 일반적 요건
Ⅵ. 결론
참고문헌
〈Abstract〉
참고문헌 (19)
참고문헌 신청
이 논문과 연관된 판례 (6)
-
대법원 1999. 6. 25. 선고 99도1141 판결
[1] 종업원지주제도는 회사의 종업원에 대한 편의제공을 당연한 전제로 하여 성립하는 것인 만큼, 종업원지주제도 하에서 회사의 경영자가 종업원의 자사주 매입을 돕기 위하여 회사자금을 지원하는 것 자체를 들어 회사에 대한 임무위배행위라고 할 수는 없을 것이나, 경영자의 자금지원의 주된 목적이 종업원의 재산형성을 통한 복리증진보다는 안정주주를
자세히 보기 -
대법원 1995. 4. 11. 선고 94누21583 판결
가. 기업회계기준 제57조, 제62조의2에 의하면 자기주식의 처분이익은 기타 자본잉여금으로서 자본준비금의 과목이고, 자기주식은 장부가액을 자본에서 차감하는 형식으로 기재하도록 규정되어 있으며, 합병회계준칙 제11조에 의하면 합병으로 인하여 취득한 자기주식의 처분익을 합병차익으로 처리하도록 규정되어 있고, 위 기업회계기준 및 합병회계준칙이 일
자세히 보기 -
서울서부지방법원 2006. 3. 24.자 2006카합393 결정
자세히 보기 -
대법원 2006. 11. 9. 선고 2004다41651,41668 판결
이사가 임무를 수행함에 있어서 법령을 위반한 행위를 한 때에는 그 행위 자체가 회사에 대하여 채무불이행에 해당하므로, 그로 인하여 회사에 손해가 발생한 이상 손해배상책임을 면할 수 없고, 위와 같은 법령을 위반한 행위에 대하여는 이사가 임무를 수행함에 있어서 선량한 관리자의 주의의무를 위반하여 임무해태로 인한 손해배상책임이 문제되는 경우에
자세히 보기 -
대법원 2004. 6. 25. 선고 2000다37326 판결
[1] 상법은 제516조 제1항에서 신주발행의 유지청구권에 관한 제424조 및 불공정한 가액으로 주식을 인수한 자의 책임에 관한 제424조의2 등을 전환사채의 발행의 경우에 준용한다고 규정하면서도 신주발행무효의 소에 관한 제429조의 준용 여부에 대해서는 아무런
자세히 보기 -
서울고등법원 1997. 5. 13.자 97라36 결정
[1] 전환사채의 발행에 무효사유가 있는 경우 그 무효를 인정하여야 하고, 그 방법은 신주발행무효의 소에 관한 상법 제429조를 유추적용할 수 있다.
자세히 보기
함께 읽어보면 좋을 논문
논문 유사도에 따라 DBpia 가 추천하는 논문입니다. 함께 보면 좋을 연관 논문을 확인해보세요!
-
자기주식의 처분과 경영권 방어
경영법률
2014 .01
-
자기주식취득과 자금지원행위
경영법률
2014 .01
-
2018년 개정 중국 회사법상의 자기주식취득제도
중국법연구
2020 .01
-
자기주식의 취득을 둘러싼 조세문제
조세법연구
2005 .07
-
자기주식처분이익의 과세문제
조세법연구
2009 .04
-
Treasury Stock Sales and Management Rights Protection: Conflicts of Interest between an Owner-manager and Small Shareholders
[KDI] Journal of Economic Policy
2017 .08
-
自己株式의 讓渡를 둘러싼 租稅問題
조세법연구
2001 .11
-
상법상 M&A법제의 변화와 과제 : 2006년 회사법 개정안을 중심으로
기업법연구
2007 .03
-
회사지배권의 변동과 자기주식의 처분에 관한 판례평석 : 대림통상사건에 관한 가처분결정을 중심으로
한양법학
2008 .02
-
商法上 株式制度의 問題點 및 課題
기업법연구
2005 .09
-
무액면주식의 도입 관련 회사법상 쟁점 연구
일감법학
2012 .01
-
일본기업집단에 있어서의 주식상호보유의 해소와 코포레이트 거버넌스
기업법연구
2003 .12
-
트레킹스톡에 관한 고찰
법학연구
2005 .11
이 논문의 저자 정보
이 논문과 함께 이용한 논문
최근 본 자료
댓글(0)
0
UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2009-366-016572090