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학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
커뮤니티
연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
초록· 키워드
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One of the characters of the roman army was that there wasn't a systematic curriculum for giving military experiences to a commander. The generals without combat experiences could command the army, this point is the reason why was criticized that the roman commander was an amateur commander in comparison with centurions. But from early days, the senators and the equites had studied a military theory with war histories and strategy books, had trained individually swordmanship and spearmanship, and had exercised a collective field training through a mock battle. And they had went often to the battlefield following unofficially a commander because of individual intimacy, or for getting combat experiences.
Whereas a commander could grasp the situation of soldiers in a garrison, centurions got familiar with living of garrison and were on intimate terms with soldiers because it were centurions who soldiers made contact every day for training and fatigues. But because a commander had an imperium, he could indicate training and fatigues to soldiers and could punish all of the soldiers including centurions. From the viewpoint of the order of ranks and an imperium, the opinion that the success of the roman army was ascribable to the influence and long-pending experiences of centurions might be reconsidered. It was the battlefield where the roles of a commander and centurions could be discriminated plainly. Centurions could give a commander advice about a military formation and the utilizing method of the configuration of the ground, but if a commander ignore the advice, it was meaningless. It was a commander who could decide the deployment method of military formation and the point of time of attack and retreat. Though a commander instructed a wrong formation and an inadequate attack, centurions had not a means of being able to check him.
The long-pending experiences and training of centurions were a valuable property to the roman army. It was true that the centurions who fought a battle in the front played a decisive role in a victory of the roman army. But if we give consideration the order of ranks and the whole aspect of a battle, we will understand the point that the role of centurions was limitary. The old and experienced centurions participated in all of defeated wars and successful wars. Nevertheless, the reason why the result of war was different was because of the difference of the capacity of a commander, not because of the difference of the influence of centurions.
Whereas a commander could grasp the situation of soldiers in a garrison, centurions got familiar with living of garrison and were on intimate terms with soldiers because it were centurions who soldiers made contact every day for training and fatigues. But because a commander had an imperium, he could indicate training and fatigues to soldiers and could punish all of the soldiers including centurions. From the viewpoint of the order of ranks and an imperium, the opinion that the success of the roman army was ascribable to the influence and long-pending experiences of centurions might be reconsidered. It was the battlefield where the roles of a commander and centurions could be discriminated plainly. Centurions could give a commander advice about a military formation and the utilizing method of the configuration of the ground, but if a commander ignore the advice, it was meaningless. It was a commander who could decide the deployment method of military formation and the point of time of attack and retreat. Though a commander instructed a wrong formation and an inadequate attack, centurions had not a means of being able to check him.
The long-pending experiences and training of centurions were a valuable property to the roman army. It was true that the centurions who fought a battle in the front played a decisive role in a victory of the roman army. But if we give consideration the order of ranks and the whole aspect of a battle, we will understand the point that the role of centurions was limitary. The old and experienced centurions participated in all of defeated wars and successful wars. Nevertheless, the reason why the result of war was different was because of the difference of the capacity of a commander, not because of the difference of the influence of centurions.
목차
Ⅰ. 머리말
Ⅱ. 군사령관의 군사적 경험
Ⅲ. 전장에서 군사령관의 역할
Ⅳ. 맺음말
【Abstract】
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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2009-911-016683002