메뉴 건너뛰기
.. 내서재 .. 알림
소속 기관/학교 인증
인증하면 논문, 학술자료 등을  무료로 열람할 수 있어요.
한국대학교, 누리자동차, 시립도서관 등 나의 기관을 확인해보세요
(국내 대학 90% 이상 구독 중)
로그인 회원가입 고객센터 ENG
주제분류

추천
검색
질문

논문 기본 정보

자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
저널정보
국민대학교 법학연구소 법학논총 法學論叢 第18輯
발행연도
2006.2
수록면
209 - 255 (47page)

이용수

표지
📌
연구주제
📖
연구배경
🔬
연구방법
🏆
연구결과
AI에게 요청하기
추천
검색
질문

초록· 키워드

오류제보하기
Since the early 1980s, Korea has strictly adopted the separation policy between banking and commerce. The strongest tool of realizing this policy was the bank ownership regulation in the Banking Act of Korea. That is, one provision under the Banking Act of Korea restricted one Korean shareholder to hold no more than 4 percent of total voting stocks of a commercial bank. Since the financial turmoil in 1997, however, the provision has been gradually amended by financial regulators themselves because it is a kind of entry barrier regulation which is out of date. After foreigners being able to acquire more than 33 percent of total voting stocks subject to a prior approval by the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC), all the Koreans except chaebol are allowed to own the same amounts of voting stocks on an equal basis with foreigners.
In the meantime, some Korean scholars have identified that the separation policy between banking and commerce does not always come with the bank ownership regulation, because the U.S. based on the same policy does not have the bank ownership provision either in its codes or regulations. Now, in addition, deregulation trend in the financial sector is the main stream all around the world, thereby focusing on the repeal of unnecessary and improper provisions under the financial law. Almost all of entry barriers are the most representative example of these provisions. Thus, the current regulation against chaebol should be re-examined deeply considering all these situations because it is unreasonable and obsolete.
This paper examines deeply article 15 through article 17 of the Banking Act of Korea which are directly related to the bank ownership regulation. Reporting duty to the FSC voluntarily by same person is very important because financial regulators themselves are not expected to know all the facts relating to the minor change of the bank share-holdings. Regarding this duty, harmonization with the Securities Exchange Act is also a significant issue because the relevant provision of the Banking Act of Korea is not consistent with the Securities Exchange Act. Without wise adjustment between both Acts, duplicate and burdensome regulations may deter the development of the Korean financial industry. The rationale determining chaebol should be more correct and advanced. Otherwise, no Koreans may compete with foreigners in the context of bank share-holdings. In this case, of course, increased concentration and monopolization in banking should be re-examined furthermore. This paper discusses all these issues in detail.

목차

Ⅰ. 처음에
Ⅱ. 은행주식 보유한도 규제
Ⅲ. 맺는 말
[Abstract]

참고문헌 (0)

참고문헌 신청

이 논문과 연관된 판례 (1)

  • 대법원 2002. 3. 15. 선고 2000다9086 판결

    [1] 주주의 대표소송에 있어서 원고 주주가 원고로서 제대로 소송수행을 하지 못하거나 혹은 상대방이 된 이사와 결탁함으로써 회사의 권리보호에 미흡하여 회사의 이익이 침해될 염려가 있는 경우 그 판결의 효력을 받는 권리귀속주체인 회사가 이를 막거나 자신의 권리를 보호하기 위하여 소송수행권한을 가진 정당한 당사자로서 그 소송에 참가할 필요가 있

    자세히 보기

함께 읽어보면 좋을 논문

논문 유사도에 따라 DBpia 가 추천하는 논문입니다. 함께 보면 좋을 연관 논문을 확인해보세요!

이 논문의 저자 정보

이 논문과 함께 이용한 논문

최근 본 자료

전체보기

댓글(0)

0

UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2009-360-016008900