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커뮤니티
연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
초록· 키워드
오류제보하기
Truth or falsity, unlike possibility or necessity, has never been treated as one of modes in modal logic, category theories, or in any other grammatical theory. The reason, I think, resides in people’s deep-rooted way of thinking that the fact, namely, the true state of affairs is the basic or the primitive of all states of affairs. This paper is a criticism on this view.
First, for the sake of clarification or elucidation of the concept ‘mode,’ my definition of mode proposed in my article H. C. Lee (2010) is reintroduced. There the definition was sought most broadly, and across the levels. Ontologically, the mode is how the world is formed; epistemologically, it is how it appears to the observers; and linguistically, it is the way of representing the ontological, and epistemological modes.
Linguistically, the mode expressions can function as predicates on the individual state of affairs that the sentence represents, or they can function as modifiers on the variable state of affairs. The modal expressions cannot modify the specific or individual events. This is one way of differentiating modification from predication.
The distinction between ‘mood’ and ‘modality’ which can be found among many scholars is spurious. The difference is just that of the ways of expressing modes: morphological, as verbal inflections or other ways. The morphological, inflectional way of expressing the mode has traditionally been called ‘Mood,’ but there is no need to isolate it from the other ways of expressing modes.
People are used to treating declarative sentences as the basic of all the types of sentences. I call this attitude “truth fundamentalism.” They insist that the other types can be derived from this declarative sentences. Davidson, who based his semantic theory of natural language on the truth-conditional theory is one of the proponents of this view. I criticize his semantics, the truth-conditional semantics, and I find no reason or evidence to posit the truth as the basic of all the other modes. Linguistically, the predicate “true,” parallel to the others, is one of the modal: It is true that..., it is possible that..., it is necessary that..., it is fortunate that.... Why do people ignore (deliberately or unconsciously) this parallelism? I think this is the effect of the truth-fundamentalism.
Next, truth-fundamentalism is criticized in other areas. First, in the area of perception, according to Hoffman et alii (2015), human perception has evolved not by developing seeing what is true or not, but by adapting to the environments. The veridical perception, that is the way of seeing things as they are, extincts and the fitness avails. What we see is not the reality itself, but is an interface between us and the reality. Second, Heylighen (2005) proposes anticipation-control theory of mind, which says that the most fundamental fact of how the mind or the brain works is not that of information processing, but that of anticipating and controlling. That is, we do not see the things as they just appear at the moment, but in the anticipation and feedback when the anticipation fails. That is people see the world not in terms of how it looks now but in the frame of anticipation and control.
In conclusion, our definition of mode is revised: mode is the way the world is formed or the way the world appears to us. In addition, it is the way it appears in the way that is most suitable for our survival and reproduction, and the way it appears in the frame of anticipation and control.
First, for the sake of clarification or elucidation of the concept ‘mode,’ my definition of mode proposed in my article H. C. Lee (2010) is reintroduced. There the definition was sought most broadly, and across the levels. Ontologically, the mode is how the world is formed; epistemologically, it is how it appears to the observers; and linguistically, it is the way of representing the ontological, and epistemological modes.
Linguistically, the mode expressions can function as predicates on the individual state of affairs that the sentence represents, or they can function as modifiers on the variable state of affairs. The modal expressions cannot modify the specific or individual events. This is one way of differentiating modification from predication.
The distinction between ‘mood’ and ‘modality’ which can be found among many scholars is spurious. The difference is just that of the ways of expressing modes: morphological, as verbal inflections or other ways. The morphological, inflectional way of expressing the mode has traditionally been called ‘Mood,’ but there is no need to isolate it from the other ways of expressing modes.
People are used to treating declarative sentences as the basic of all the types of sentences. I call this attitude “truth fundamentalism.” They insist that the other types can be derived from this declarative sentences. Davidson, who based his semantic theory of natural language on the truth-conditional theory is one of the proponents of this view. I criticize his semantics, the truth-conditional semantics, and I find no reason or evidence to posit the truth as the basic of all the other modes. Linguistically, the predicate “true,” parallel to the others, is one of the modal: It is true that..., it is possible that..., it is necessary that..., it is fortunate that.... Why do people ignore (deliberately or unconsciously) this parallelism? I think this is the effect of the truth-fundamentalism.
Next, truth-fundamentalism is criticized in other areas. First, in the area of perception, according to Hoffman et alii (2015), human perception has evolved not by developing seeing what is true or not, but by adapting to the environments. The veridical perception, that is the way of seeing things as they are, extincts and the fitness avails. What we see is not the reality itself, but is an interface between us and the reality. Second, Heylighen (2005) proposes anticipation-control theory of mind, which says that the most fundamental fact of how the mind or the brain works is not that of information processing, but that of anticipating and controlling. That is, we do not see the things as they just appear at the moment, but in the anticipation and feedback when the anticipation fails. That is people see the world not in terms of how it looks now but in the frame of anticipation and control.
In conclusion, our definition of mode is revised: mode is the way the world is formed or the way the world appears to us. In addition, it is the way it appears in the way that is most suitable for our survival and reproduction, and the way it appears in the frame of anticipation and control.
목차
1. 들어가기
2. 양상의 정의
3. 양상과 양상성
4. 물건의 양상, 사건의 양상, 그리고 상층위의 양상
5. 양상의 기능 : 수식과 서술
6. 참의 개념과 진위조건 의미론
7. 참이나 거짓은 양상의 하나이다
8. 사실적 인식과 적응적 인식
9. 예상-통제적 마음
10. 맺음
참고문헌
Abstract
참고문헌 (17)
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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2018-710-003399615