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학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
커뮤니티
연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
초록· 키워드
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The tender offer is a well-known method of gaining control of a corporation. The tender offer may be used as the means of the hostile M&A. The hostile M&A means that the board of a target company intends to oppose the M&A. In other words, it means that the M&A take place without the consent of the board of a target company. In the case of the hostile M&A, the board of a target company tries to block the M&A so as to maintain the independence of a target company. In the case of the hostile M&A, therefore, it is common for the board of a target company to employ various defensive measures. Major defensive measures available to a target company include poison pill, lock-up, and so on.
Traditionally, the Delaware court of USA has applied business judgment rule to the defensive tactics of the board of directors of target company. The Delaware court, however, has limited the application of business judgment rule in order to solve the problem of a conflict of interest between the board and the company or the shareholders when the board made a decision to employ any defensive measures. Especially, the standard of judicial review that the Delaware Supreme Court has adopted in relation to defensive tactics of the target company is that the directors should show reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed and the defensive measure is reasonable in relation to the threat posed.
As affirmative aspects of the hostile M&A have been reviewed in Korea, activities of the hostile M&A are expected to increase. Under the Korean Commercial Code, the board of a target company can employ a defensive measure in the case of the hostile M&A. In this connection, the legitimacy of defensive tactics of a target company should be judged as follows.
First, the board of directors of a target company can employ a defensive measure concerning the hostile M&A as far as the board of directors can reasonably make a judgment.
Second, the board of directors of a target company can take into account all factors concerning the best interests of the company and its shareholders as the board of directors makes a decision to block the hostile M&A.
Third, the board of directors of a target company should show reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed and that the defensive measure is reasonable in relation to the threat posed. In doing so, the directors should be protected by business judgment rule.
Traditionally, the Delaware court of USA has applied business judgment rule to the defensive tactics of the board of directors of target company. The Delaware court, however, has limited the application of business judgment rule in order to solve the problem of a conflict of interest between the board and the company or the shareholders when the board made a decision to employ any defensive measures. Especially, the standard of judicial review that the Delaware Supreme Court has adopted in relation to defensive tactics of the target company is that the directors should show reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed and the defensive measure is reasonable in relation to the threat posed.
As affirmative aspects of the hostile M&A have been reviewed in Korea, activities of the hostile M&A are expected to increase. Under the Korean Commercial Code, the board of a target company can employ a defensive measure in the case of the hostile M&A. In this connection, the legitimacy of defensive tactics of a target company should be judged as follows.
First, the board of directors of a target company can employ a defensive measure concerning the hostile M&A as far as the board of directors can reasonably make a judgment.
Second, the board of directors of a target company can take into account all factors concerning the best interests of the company and its shareholders as the board of directors makes a decision to block the hostile M&A.
Third, the board of directors of a target company should show reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed and that the defensive measure is reasonable in relation to the threat posed. In doing so, the directors should be protected by business judgment rule.
목차
Ⅰ. 序論
Ⅱ. 敵對的 M&A의 經濟的 效果에 관한 論爭
Ⅲ. 敵對的 M&A에 대한 對象會社의 防禦行爲의 適法性 判斷基準
Ⅳ. 우리法上의 論議
Ⅴ. 結論
參考文獻
〈Abstract〉
참고문헌 (89)
참고문헌 신청
[보고서] - 권재열 / 2005 / 적대적 M&A의 방어방법에 관한 연구
[단행본] - 권종호 / 2005 / 일본의 경영권방어관련 회사법개정 동향과 시사점 / 서울: 전국경제인연합회
[단행본] - 손재호 / 2006 / 적대적 M&A / 서울: 매일경제신문사
[단행본] - 姜熙甲 / 1994 / 敵對的 企業買受에 대한 防禦策의 限界: 美國의 Delaware州判例法을 中心으로, 國際航空宇宙法 및 商事法의 諸問題(昡谷金斗煥敎授華甲記念論文) / 서울: 法文社
[학술지(정기간행물)] - 姜熙甲 / 1992 / 美國에 있어서의 敵對的企業買受의 防禦策과 理事의 責任 / 明知大 社會科學論叢 7
[단행본] - 권종호 / 2005 / 일본의 경영권방어관련 회사법개정 동향과 시사점 / 서울: 전국경제인연합회
[단행본] - 손재호 / 2006 / 적대적 M&A / 서울: 매일경제신문사
[단행본] - 姜熙甲 / 1994 / 敵對的 企業買受에 대한 防禦策의 限界: 美國의 Delaware州判例法을 中心으로, 國際航空宇宙法 및 商事法의 諸問題(昡谷金斗煥敎授華甲記念論文) / 서울: 法文社
[학술지(정기간행물)] - 姜熙甲 / 1992 / 美國에 있어서의 敵對的企業買受의 防禦策과 理事의 責任 / 明知大 社會科學論叢 7
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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2009-366-017114578