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학술저널
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한국국제정치학회 국제정치논총 The Korean Journal of International Relations Vol.48 No.5
발행연도
2008.12
수록면
105 - 131 (27page)
DOI
10.14731/kjis.2008.12.48.5.105

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This article investigates how the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) make decisions on in the appointment and censure of the Commission. The key contention is that MEPs' behaviour in these votes is ultimately determined by their policy preferences. Based on this, I develop some hypotheses about MEPs' preferences on the control of the Commission. These are then tested on the voting behaviour of MEPs in the roll-call votes on the appointment of three Commissions, respectively headed by Jacques Santer, Romano Prodi and Jose Manuel Barroso, and the censure of the Santer Commission. The finings confirms the contention. When deciding how to vote, each MEP makes a judgment about whether policy outcomes from the EU are likely to be moved closer or further away from his/her preferences as a result of electing or removing a particular Commission. Also, the partisan affiliation of MEPs and Commission does matter. In the appointment of the Commission, the candidates for the Commission President and the Commission as a whole can draw support from three groups: MEPs from governing parties, MEPs from parties that will have Commissioners, and MEPs from ideologically similar party groups in the Parliament. With one commissioner per member state and the 'second-order election' as the characteristics of the European Parliament election, the findings implies that the Commission and the Council can be more vulnerable to the European Parliament's right to make and break the Commission as smaller portion of the MEPs belong to the first two groups.

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【ABSTRACT】
Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. The Rules for Electing and Censuring the Commission
Ⅲ. Determinants of MEP Voting Behaviour in the Election/Censure of the Commission
Ⅳ. Statistical Analysis
Ⅴ. Conclusion
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