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Does Rawls's Interpretation of Kant Deform Kant's Ethics? : Focusing on Rawls's Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy
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롤즈의 해석은 칸트 윤리학을 왜곡하는가 : 롤즈의 『도덕철학사강의』를 중심으로

논문 기본 정보

Type
Academic journal
Author
Kim, Eun-Hee (건국대)
Journal
The Society of Philosophical Studies Journal of The Society of philosophical studies Vol.118 KCI Accredited Journals
Published
2017.9
Pages
143 - 175 (33page)
DOI
10.23908/JSPS.2017.09.118.143

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Result
Does Rawls's Interpretation of Kant Deform Kant's Ethics? : Focusing on Rawls's Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy
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Abstract· Keywords

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Many critics have cast doubt on Rawls’s Kant. First, some criticize that Rawls’s theory of justice which he calls a kantian one invokes, in fact, empirical conception of practical reason in respect to the parties in the original position. Against this critique, I argue that the parties’ nature must be interpreted in light of the whole construction as a procedural representation of Kant’s categorical imperative. In relation to this issue, some can criticize that the parties’ interest in “primary social goods” is anti-kantian. The conceptual root of “primary social goods” seems to be Kant’s concept of “true human needs”, and I acknowledge that Rawls’s usage of the concept of “true human needs” tends to distort the meaning of Kant’s original usage of that. I argue, nevertheless, if a new concept which has no burden of interpreting Kant’ texts can be introduced as the role that “true human needs” plays, and at the same time that new concept can cohere into Kant’s whole spirit, the concept of “primary social goods” cannot support the critique that Rawls deforms Kant’s conception of practical reason.
Second, some critics claim that Kant’s ethics includes the basis like moral laws, but Rawls seems to deny that basis of ethical theory by accepting a moral constructivism. I argue that such a claim begins from misunderstanding of Rawls’s moral constructivism. His constructivism accepts a basis such as an idea of person as free and equal, reasonable and rational being. Besides this, there are many critiques of “reflective equilibrium”. But such critiques cannot pose a challenge to Rawls’s interpretation of Kant itself, although it might be a challenge to Rawls’s theory of justice. For Rawls has never used that idea in interpreting Kant’s ethics itself.
Finally, some might wonder Rawls’s position as to Kant’s metaphysical factors such as god’s presence and spirit’s immortality. I show that Rawls can dispose of them in light of their places in moral constructivism. He replaces the reasonable faith in them by reasonable faith in the realm of ends, because only the latter fits Kant’s moral constructivism well.

Contents

【요약문】
1. 서론
2. 실천이성 : 롤즈는 경험적 실천이성관에 의존하는가?
3. 정당화 : 롤즈는 토대를 부정하는가?
4. 형이상학 : 롤즈는 칸트의 형이상학적 요소를 버리는가
5. 결론
참고문헌
〈Abstract〉

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UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2018-100-001314496