소설이나 연극, 영화와 같은 허구적 서사예술작품을 감상함으로써 무언가를 배우는 것이 가능할까? 만일 그렇다면, 그러한 ‘배움’은 허구적 서사예술의 예술적 가치에 기여한다고 할 수 있을까? 우리가 허구적 서사예술을 감상함으로써 인지적으로 가치있는 산출물들을 얻을 수 있다는 직관이 널리 공유되는 한편, 일군의 철학자들은 과연 ‘허구’가 우리에게 그러한 산출물들을 제공할 수 있을지에 대한 의심을 제기해왔다.
대략적으로 말해서, 허구작품이 인지적 가치를 가진다는 주장을 예술적 인지주의(artistic cognitivism)라고 부른다면, 그에 반대하는 입장을 비인지주의(noncognitivism), 혹은 반인지주의(anti-cognitivism)라고 부를 수 있을 것이다. 그러나 피터 라마르크와 같은 몇몇 반인지주의자들은 허구적 서사예술이 지식이나 믿음, 기술 등을 어떻게든 우리에게 줄 수 있으며, 또한 바로 그러한 이유로 허구적 서사예술이 인지적 가치를 가질 수 있다는 점을 인정하면서도, 그 인지적 가치가 허구적 서사예술의 ‘예술적’ 가치의 일부가 아니라고 주장한다.
본고는 이러한 ‘제한적’ 반인지주의의 공격에 대응할 수 있는 인지주의의 한 논변을 제안하고자 한다. 이를 위하여 기존의 인지주의-반인지주의 논쟁을 재정리하고 ‘진정한’ 인지주의의 입장을 정식화한다. 또한 이러한 정식화를 바탕으로 ‘심오함’이라는 특성이, 인지적 특성이자 미적 특성으로서, 허구적 서사예술작품의 인지적 가치뿐만 아니라 예술적 가치에도 기여할 수 있다고 주장할 것이다.
Is it possible to learn from fictional narrative art, such as stories, novels, plays, or films? If so, is the ‘learning’ supposed to be the part of the practice of art? This paper deals with these two questions. The former has been dealt with by philosophers who have interest in the issue of cognitive value of fictional narrative art, but the latter has been relatively overlooked.
It seems that there is a strong intuition that we can have cognitive gains such as knowledge, beliefs, or skills somehow when (or while) we appreciate a fictional narrative artwork. On the other hand, some philosophers, influenced by the traditional epistemology, have been raising questions whether ‘fiction’ really could provide us with cognitively valuable outcomes. To put it roughly, the ones who argue that fictional narrative art has cognitive value could be labeled as ‘(artistic) cognitivists’, while the others who are against them could be named as ‘(artistic) noncognitivists’, or ‘anti-cognitivists’. However, some of anti-cognitivists, such as Peter Lamarque, insist that fictional narrative art can provide knowledge, skills, and so on for its audience in some sense, and also it might have cognitive value for that reason, but still that is not a part of its artistic value.
Lamarque’s view is based on the ‘institutionalist ontological argument’, which suggests that art has its specific practice, and the practice constitutes the essence of art. Applying it to this issue in favor of anti-cognitivists, Lamarque holds thatcognitivevaluewhichartcanpotentiallyhavedoesnotconstitutethepracticeofartqua art, and thereby does not constitute the essence of art. To wit, cognitive value that somehow can attribute to literary works is not a part of the practice of literature qua art.
I agree in principle with Lamarque’s view which distinguishes the practice of art from other practices in a human community, and thereby discerns the artistic value from among all kinds of value that art can potentially have. However, apart from my favor to the institutionalist ontology of art, it is deeply doubtful whether artistic practice truly does not include considerations on a cognitive quality which is unique to art, especially regarding the practice of art-evaluating.
To clarify this problem and suggest my own argument on this issue, first of all I formulate a position of ‘genuine’ cognitivism, reorganizing the debate between cognitivists and anti-cognitivists. Second, based on the formulation, I argue that the quality of ‘profundity’, as a cognitive and aesthetic quality of a literary work, can contribute to not only cognitive value of a fictional narrative artwork, but also artistic value of it, and therefore it is logically and practically legitimate to say that at least some cognitive value that fictional narrative art would have affects intrinsically its artistic value.