본 연구는 대규모기업집단에 소속된 기업의 소유지배괴리도(wedge)가 기업의 자본구조 결정에 미치는 영향을 분석하였다. 소유지배괴리도는 지배주주 일가가 실제 소유지분보다 얼마나 많은 의결권을 가질 수 있는가를 나타내는 측정치로서, 소유지배괴리도가 커질수록 지배주주는 기업 경영에 더 많은 통제권을 행사할 수 있지만, 금전적 책임은 상대적으로 줄어들게 된다. 선행연구에 따르면 의결권이 소유권을 초과하게 되면, 대리인문제를 유발하게 되고 자본구조 의사결정에 영향을 미칠 수 있게 되는데, 외부 감시를 회피하고자 부채의 규모를 줄일 유인이 있다. 그리고 채권시장에서는 소유지배괴리도가 커지면, 지배구조의 건전성이 낮아지고 대리인비용이 증가해서 금융기관은 장기대출보다 단기대출을 선호하게 된다. 이를 검증하기 위해 2013년부터 2018년까지 총 896개의 표본을 대상으로 패널분석을 이용하여 실증분석하였다. 그리고 지배구조의 건전성 수준에 따른 소유지배괴리도의 영향을 살펴보기 위해 ESG 지배구조 수준별 집단 분석을 하였다. 분석결과는 지배주주의 소유지배괴리도가 부채의 규모와 장기부채 비율을 낮추는 것으로 나타났지만, 이러한 관계는 지배구조가 우수한 기업에서는 발견할 수 없었다. 이 연구결과는 초과의결권을 이용한 지배주주의 사익추구가 자본구조 결정에 영향을 미치고, 건전한 지배구조가 과도한 지배력이 유발할 수 있는 자본구조 결정과 관련한 대리인 문제를 완화할 수 있음을 시사한다.
According to the agency theory, since professional managers strive for their own interests rather than those of shareholders, they stick to companies" short-term interests during their tenure for the purpose of paying bonuses and serving a second term. In addition, there is a high possibility that it will hinder the growth of the company by showing a conservative attitude toward NPV positive investments. Therefore, there is a conflict of interests between management and shareholders, resulting in agent costs. Agent costs are reduced only when an increase in the manager"s ownership leads to an agreement of interests between managers and shareholders, and in this context, the controlling shareholder"s share ownership ratio has a negative relationship with agent costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The agency problem of controlling shareholders increases as the gap between corporate control rights and ownership rights widens. In Singapore, Korea, Japan, and other Asian countries, the ownership control is prominent and controlling shareholders strengthen their control through pyramid structures or cross-shareholdings (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000). In the same context, the agency problem arising from the difference between controlling shareholder ownership and voting rights can affect capital structure decisions of firm, and there is a negative relationship between the gap (controlling shareholder ownership and voting rights) and long-term debt (Ben-Nasr, Boubaker, & Rouatbi, 2015). Also, Anginer, Demirguc-Kunt, Tepe, & Simsir (2019) report an interesting empirical research showing that there is a negative relationship between the soundness of governance and short-term debt. This result suggests that the soundness of governance in the bond market may be reflected, putting pressure on determining the maturity of bond. Therefore, the higher the gap between controlling shareholder ownership rights and voting rights, the lower the level of governance and higher agency costs, making it difficult to raise long-term debt from the market, which can be expected to be financed by short-term debt with a high level of monitoring by the market. Despite the very high economic dependency of large business groups due to the nature of the domestic industrial structure, there is a lack of research focused on the level of controlling shareholders" stake and debt maturity structure as a research topic in the capital structure study until recently. This study examines the effect of the wedge of controlling shareholders on the capital structure (level of debt and maturity of debt) of group-affiliated Korean firms. A Wedge is a measure of how much more voting rights can be exercised by the controlling shareholder"s family than the actual ownership. As Wedge increases, the controlling shareholder can exercise more control over the management of the firm, but its financial responsibility is relatively reduced. A prior study suggests that controlling shareholder’s voting rights exceeding cash flow rights would cause agency problems and affect capital structure decision making, which would have an incentive to reduce the total liabilities to avoid external monitoring. And in the bond market, if the Wedge between voting rights and cash flow rights increases, the governance structure is lowered and agent costs increase, and financial institutions prefer short-term loans to long-term loans. To test this hypothesis, a total of 896 samples from 2013 to 2018 were analyzed using the panel analysis. In addition, a sub-group analysis by the governance level (ESG) is conducted to examine the effect of the Wedge on capital structure decisions. The Wedge variable is measured by a direct equity standard method used by the Fair Trade Commission, and companies with mutual shares are excluded from the calculation because they are very limited due to restrictions on cross-shareholding. The debt-to-equity ratio (ADLEV) used in the study is the adjusted debt ratio that deducts the average debt ratio by industry (Korea Standard Industry Classification) from the general debt ratio. In order to analyze the impact on the characteristics of debt maturity, the long-term debt ratio (LTLEV) is measured by dividing the sum of long-term borrowings and liquid long-term borrowings into the total assets. The result shows that the Wedge has a significantly negative effect on leverage and long-term liabilities, but this relationship could not be found in a firm with a good governance structure. As Wedge increases, it has a negative impact on long-term debt. Agency costs arising from poor governance can be interpreted as strengthening market monitoring to reduce long-term debt and pressure to increase short-term debt, which has a high level of market monitoring. A sub-group analysis based on the ESG governance level shows a significant negative impact on debt level and debt maturity only in groups with a low ESG governance level. It suggests that the level of governance could alleviate the impact of ownership governance on debt levels and debt maturity choices. Our findings indicate that the pursuit of private interests of controlling shareholders using excess voting rights is influencing the decision of capital structure. And this suggests that the good governance can mitigate the agency problem that excess control rights have on the capital structure. This study has a contribution in that it is an empirical analysis of how the agency problem of Wedge, the difference between controlling shareholders" voting rights and actual ownership rights, affects the corporate debt selection decision. In addition, it provides implications for related research in that it presents empirical results that could have a discriminatory impact depending on the controlling shareholder"s governance level.