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논문 기본 정보

자료유형
학술저널
저자정보
저널정보
한국공법학회 공법연구 공법연구 제33집 제3호
발행연도
2005.5
수록면
229 - 251 (23page)

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초록· 키워드

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The early years of Roh Moo-hyun government, the fourth since the establishment of the 1987 constitution, can be identified, above all, as a period of judicialization or juridification. In the first two years of Roh Government, we witnessed the growing influence of the courts, ordinary and constitutional, on matters which were once considered purely political. The list of evidence showing this new trend in Korean constitutional reality includes the first impeachment trial against President in the history of Korean constitutional democracy which resulted in the curtailment of presidential power by the Constitutional Court while impeachment itself being rejected, the unconstitutionality decision of the Special Act for the Construction of the New Administrative Capital which means the collapse of the most ambitious agendum of Roh government and the suspension of the Saemangeum Reclamation Project considered to be one of the biggest national projects in Korean modern history.In addition, all most all political issues generating political strifes between pro-Roh political forces and anti-Roh forces, in particular the so-called “four major reform bills”, that is, enactments of reform bills (1) to repeal the National Security Act, (2) to review the nation’s modern history, (3) to regulate the monopoly of newspaper market and (4) to reform private schools, are strongly supposed to be in docket of the Constitutional Court in the wake of their passage. The author argues that a political cause of this phenomenon would be the recent power transfer from old elites to new elites in Korean society. Old elites who have been dominant politically as well as economically and socially for almost sixty years lost two consecutive presidential elections and even the majority in the National Assembly in 2004. It is quite natural that they turn on the judicial powers, the champions of the rule of law, in order to challenge reformist drive of new political forces.In reality, in some controversial cases, holders of the judicial powers whose professional career could not be free from the old authoritarian and bureaucratic legacy appear to undertake a self-imposed task in bolstering such an expectation on the side of the old elites. At the same time, some conservative propaganda against reform bills try to stigmatize Roh government as populist or socialist destroyer of the rule of law and, on the surface, the tension between democracy and the rule of law represents the picture of the political confrontation between the old and new elites.However, this representation on the level of principle is a false one. Both two constitutional principles are politically neutral as far as they are both basic elements of constitutionalism. For one thing, democracy as an element of constitutionalism is a value-oriented principle of government rather than a majoritarian form of government so that it can be interdependent and compatible with the rule of law rather than irreconcilable each other. They cannot be partisan tools to manipulate each other in certain contexts. Consequently, it cannot be the constitutional principles such as democracy and the rule of law but the behavior or aptitude of actors in constitutional arrangements that matters on debates on the judicialization of politics.Judicialization or juridification is an ambivalent phenomenon. On the one hand, it can control the abuse of political powers in the direction of protecting human rights and other constitutional values and thus enhance constitutionalism. On the other hand, however, it can distort first of all democratic visions enshrined in the Constitution by replacing constitutional values and decisions with that of a small group of unaccountable judges in the bench. The ambivalence of judicialization persuades us to take a middle route. The judicial powers are entitled to review political decisions but only on certain conditions and in a self-contained manner. Such conditions include democratic constitution of the judicial powers, prudential exercise of judicial powers based upon persuasive reasoning and rationales, and the reservation of the critical public sphere for the judicial powers. The author believes that if jurists with judicial powers were to go hand in hand with us under this strategy, our constitutional democracy will be upgraded in the near future.

목차

Ⅰ. 머리말Ⅱ. 대한민국 헌정질서의 기본형태 ― 변형적 대통령제와 권력통제의 메카니즘Ⅲ. 정치의 사법화의 의의와 노무현정부 전반기에서의 정치적 함의Ⅳ. 정치의 사법화 현상이 가지는 정치적 함의에 대한 헌법원리론적 검토Ⅴ. 결론을 대신하여참고문헌

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