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Property rights institutions and the political budget cycle
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소유권 보호와 정치적 예산순환

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Type
Academic journal
Author
Sangwon Park (한국외국어대학교) Min Sujin (성균관대학교) LEE DONGWON (성균관대학교)
Journal
한국경제발전학회 경제발전연구 경제발전연구 제28권 제2호 KCI Accredited Journals
Published
2022.6
Pages
33 - 70 (38page)

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Property rights institutions and the political budget cycle
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This study examines the impact of property rights institutions on the political budget cycle. A simple equilibrium model of political budget cycles suggests that property rights institutions implicitly constrain the electoral cycle by making pre-election fiscal manipulation less effective in gaining votes. Using a panel of 64 democracies over the period 1987-2016, we confirm that a political budget cycle is conditional on the strength of property rights institutions. Countries with stronger property rights institutions experience a smaller electoral cycle. Our findings imply that property rights institutions may provide a socially efficient mechanism for protecting the welfare of taxpayers.

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