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학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
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연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
초록· 키워드
오류제보하기
Mass unemployment is the principal economic policy problem in most countries nowadays and rising unemployment is often associated with more open goods and factor markets which are labeled with the buzzword “globalization”. Globalization can be summarized as the global circulation of goods, services and capital, but also of information, ideas and people. Tremendous advances have been made by large segments of the world population in this age of globalization. Yet, there is a fear that globalization is exacerbating inequality, and perhaps even worsening the lot of the poor by eroding their incomes, increasing their vulnerability, and adding to their disempowerment. This fear may not be universal, but it does play a role in the public perception that cannot be ignored.
There can be no doubt that global competition forces countries to put greater emphasis on the efficiency aspects of labor market institutions by leaving less scope for achieving distributional goals via labor market institutions. The liberalization of trade and of capital flows is in acute danger of being reverted if the perception becomes even more widespread that growing unemployment is the inevitable consequence of globalization.
During the last decade a growing number of commentators have argued that recent economic and technological developments, such as increased international competition, labor market deregulation, and the rise of the internet, have increased job insecurity in developed countries and have thereby made some groups in society worse off. There is a widely held view that this increase in insecurity has been caused both by an increase in the probability of job separation for given employment arrangements and also by a shift towards more flexible, and intrinsically more instable, employment arrangements.
The question of whether and to what extent job security regulations adversely affect labor market flexibility remains a matter of continuing controversy. Critics have claimed that strong job rights prevent employers from adjusting to economic fluctuations and secular changes in demand. It has also been alleged that, by inhibiting layoffs during downturns, strong job security provisions reduce employers’ willingness to hire during upturns and thereby contribute to unemployment.
However, the effects of job security regulations on labor market adjustment are poorly understood. Although job security regulations would be expected to slow the adjustment of employment to an unexpected shock, the magnitude of this effect is debatable.
To just weaken or abolish such job-security provisions is not really creating labor flexibility, but rather just labor expendability. Allowing employers to “fire at will” does not necessarily provide for shifting workers smoothly from where they are no longer needed to where they can be productive - it may often simply put the dismissed workers on the street, unemployed. Reducing employers' responsibility to provide job security inevitably ends up imposing new tasks on the state, which must provide stronger and wider social safety nets to take care of the unemployed workers.
With economic globalization and technological change creating rapidchanges in labor markets, the danger of one's job being abolished is very real. Job-security arrangements are simply an insurance policy against economic disaster for workers and their families.
The insider-outsider explanation is based on the idea that the level of wages is primarily determined by the currently employed workers (the so-called ‘insiders’), with unemployed (the ‘outsiders’) playing little or no role in the process of wage bargaining. Furthermore, this approach attempts to explain why unemployed workers do not compete for existing jobs by offering to work at jobs for which they are qualified at a wage lower than that currently being paid to incumbents. The existence of costs associated with insider-outsider turnover might explain why firms do not replace their high-wage insiders with low-wage outsiders. Accordingly, involuntary unemployment can arise due to the existence of turnover costs such as hiring, training and firing costs or the costs generated by the disincentive to cooperate with outsiders, that make it costly to the firm to replace an insider worker with an unemployed worker. The rent associated with these turnover costs gives some labor market power to insiders in the process of wage negotiation.
In developing countries, the formal sector employers and workers who would enjoy labor flexibility and guarantees of job security in such a system would not only have an obligation to help pay for the benefits it would provide, but also a social obligation to help their fellow citizens who are unemployed or underemployed in the informal sector. While it is unfair to label those in the formal sector an “economic aristocracy”, it is true that they are in far better economic circumstances than firms and workers in the informal sector.
The long-term goal would be not just to protect the favored situation of the formal sector, but eventually to bring the entire society into formalized, productive economic activity, ending the oft-lamented “segmentation” of the labor market and of the economy as a whole.
Such arrangements in various economic sectors could give a nation's economy the ability to move workers quickly and smoothly from one job to another, without social disruption, and this would make the economy very competitive in the global marketplace.
There can be no doubt that global competition forces countries to put greater emphasis on the efficiency aspects of labor market institutions by leaving less scope for achieving distributional goals via labor market institutions. The liberalization of trade and of capital flows is in acute danger of being reverted if the perception becomes even more widespread that growing unemployment is the inevitable consequence of globalization.
During the last decade a growing number of commentators have argued that recent economic and technological developments, such as increased international competition, labor market deregulation, and the rise of the internet, have increased job insecurity in developed countries and have thereby made some groups in society worse off. There is a widely held view that this increase in insecurity has been caused both by an increase in the probability of job separation for given employment arrangements and also by a shift towards more flexible, and intrinsically more instable, employment arrangements.
The question of whether and to what extent job security regulations adversely affect labor market flexibility remains a matter of continuing controversy. Critics have claimed that strong job rights prevent employers from adjusting to economic fluctuations and secular changes in demand. It has also been alleged that, by inhibiting layoffs during downturns, strong job security provisions reduce employers’ willingness to hire during upturns and thereby contribute to unemployment.
However, the effects of job security regulations on labor market adjustment are poorly understood. Although job security regulations would be expected to slow the adjustment of employment to an unexpected shock, the magnitude of this effect is debatable.
To just weaken or abolish such job-security provisions is not really creating labor flexibility, but rather just labor expendability. Allowing employers to “fire at will” does not necessarily provide for shifting workers smoothly from where they are no longer needed to where they can be productive - it may often simply put the dismissed workers on the street, unemployed. Reducing employers' responsibility to provide job security inevitably ends up imposing new tasks on the state, which must provide stronger and wider social safety nets to take care of the unemployed workers.
With economic globalization and technological change creating rapidchanges in labor markets, the danger of one's job being abolished is very real. Job-security arrangements are simply an insurance policy against economic disaster for workers and their families.
The insider-outsider explanation is based on the idea that the level of wages is primarily determined by the currently employed workers (the so-called ‘insiders’), with unemployed (the ‘outsiders’) playing little or no role in the process of wage bargaining. Furthermore, this approach attempts to explain why unemployed workers do not compete for existing jobs by offering to work at jobs for which they are qualified at a wage lower than that currently being paid to incumbents. The existence of costs associated with insider-outsider turnover might explain why firms do not replace their high-wage insiders with low-wage outsiders. Accordingly, involuntary unemployment can arise due to the existence of turnover costs such as hiring, training and firing costs or the costs generated by the disincentive to cooperate with outsiders, that make it costly to the firm to replace an insider worker with an unemployed worker. The rent associated with these turnover costs gives some labor market power to insiders in the process of wage negotiation.
In developing countries, the formal sector employers and workers who would enjoy labor flexibility and guarantees of job security in such a system would not only have an obligation to help pay for the benefits it would provide, but also a social obligation to help their fellow citizens who are unemployed or underemployed in the informal sector. While it is unfair to label those in the formal sector an “economic aristocracy”, it is true that they are in far better economic circumstances than firms and workers in the informal sector.
The long-term goal would be not just to protect the favored situation of the formal sector, but eventually to bring the entire society into formalized, productive economic activity, ending the oft-lamented “segmentation” of the labor market and of the economy as a whole.
Such arrangements in various economic sectors could give a nation's economy the ability to move workers quickly and smoothly from one job to another, without social disruption, and this would make the economy very competitive in the global marketplace.
목차
Ⅰ. 문제의 제기
Ⅱ. 세계화와 노동의 유연화
Ⅲ. 노동시장의 양극화
Ⅳ. 우리나라 고용보호법의 문제점 및 유연화
Ⅴ. 노동법의 정체성
Ⅵ. 맺는 말
참고문헌 (0)
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가. 정리해고에 정당한 이유가 있기 위하여 필요한 요건 중 해고회피를 위한 노력을 다하여야 한다는 것은 사용자가 근로자의 해고범위를 최소화하기 위하여 경영방침이나 작업방식의 합리화, 신규채용의 금지, 일시휴직 및 희망퇴직의 활용 및 전근 등의 가능한 조치를 취하는 것을 의미한다.
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대법원 1991. 12. 10. 선고 91다8647 판결
정리해고의 한 요건인 `긴박한 기업경영상의 필요성’이라는 것은 기업의 인원삭감 조치가 영업성적의 악화라는 기업의 경제적인 이유뿐만 아니라 생산성의 향상, 경쟁력의 회복 내지 증강에 대처하기 위한 작업형태의 변경, 신기술의 도입이라는 기술적인 이유와 그러한 기술혁신에 따라 생기는 산업의 구조적 변화도 이유로 하여 실제 이루어지고 있고 또한
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