지원사업
학술연구/단체지원/교육 등 연구자 활동을 지속하도록 DBpia가 지원하고 있어요.
커뮤니티
연구자들이 자신의 연구와 전문성을 널리 알리고, 새로운 협력의 기회를 만들 수 있는 네트워킹 공간이에요.
초록· 키워드
오류제보하기
This paper reviews several cases such as Myers v. U. S., Humphrey's Executor v. U. S., Wiener v. U. S., Buckley v. Valeo, INS v. Chadha, Consumer Energy Council of America V. FERC, Bowsher v. Synar and Morrison v. Olson, and comes to the conclusions of the President's removal power.
First, even though there is no express provision of removal power, considering the relationship between executive power and the duty to faithfully execute the laws under article 2, the removal power is the necessary incidental power to or part of them.
Second, basically, as removal power is the President's exclusive right which covers only purely executive officers, it is independent of any department of the government. However, although an executive officer who also exercises a quasi-legislative or quasi-judiciary duty cannot be an purely executive officer, the President's removal power is not automatically restricted. In that case, it must be reviewed whether the officer has a policy-making power which is critical to President's executive power and then, the President must has a discretion to remove him. If the officer does not have such a power, he is not a purely executive officer and Congress can restrict exercise of removal power over the officer.
Third, Congress must not interfere with the power and duty exercised under article 2 of U. S. Constitution in limiting President's removal power. Congress can limit reasons exercising removal power, but cannot limit the power itself.
First, even though there is no express provision of removal power, considering the relationship between executive power and the duty to faithfully execute the laws under article 2, the removal power is the necessary incidental power to or part of them.
Second, basically, as removal power is the President's exclusive right which covers only purely executive officers, it is independent of any department of the government. However, although an executive officer who also exercises a quasi-legislative or quasi-judiciary duty cannot be an purely executive officer, the President's removal power is not automatically restricted. In that case, it must be reviewed whether the officer has a policy-making power which is critical to President's executive power and then, the President must has a discretion to remove him. If the officer does not have such a power, he is not a purely executive officer and Congress can restrict exercise of removal power over the officer.
Third, Congress must not interfere with the power and duty exercised under article 2 of U. S. Constitution in limiting President's removal power. Congress can limit reasons exercising removal power, but cannot limit the power itself.
목차
Ⅰ. 머리말
Ⅱ. 미국대통령의 공무원해임권의 본질
Ⅲ. 미국대통령의 공무원임명권의 본질
Ⅳ. 판례법리의 변화
Ⅴ. 맺음말
〈ABSTRACT〉
참고문헌 (0)
참고문헌 신청함께 읽어보면 좋을 논문
논문 유사도에 따라 DBpia 가 추천하는 논문입니다. 함께 보면 좋을 연관 논문을 확인해보세요!
-
미국헌법과 행정권
미국헌법연구
2007 .02
-
美國 大統領의 立法에 관한 權限
미국헌법연구
2008 .02
-
기업지배구조의 획일화 : 집행임원제도의 도입의무화에 관한 상법개정안을 보고
기업법연구
2013 .06
-
執行任員制度의 導入을 위한 立法의 課題
대한경영학회 학술발표대회 발표논문집
2007 .08
-
美國 憲法상 戰爭權의 規範構造
미국헌법연구
2006 .09
-
일본 기업의 집행임원제도에 관한 연구
기업법연구
2008 .03
-
2011년 개정상법상 집행임원의 법적 지위에 관한 비판적 검토
한양법학
2011 .08
-
執行任員制度에 관한 商法 改正案의 問題點 檢討
기업법연구
2007 .12
-
금융회사 집행임원의 개선방안
법과기업연구
2014 .12
-
헌정제도로서의 ‘국무총리’ : 우리 헌법사에서의 그 진동의 궤적
法學論文集
2010 .01
-
개정 상법상 이사회와 집행임원간의 권한 분배
중앙법학
2013 .12
-
헌법개정론 재고(再考)－대통령과 국회의 권한배분 문제를 중심으로－
法學論文集
2015 .01
-
최근 株式會社 執行任員制度의 導入과 運用方向
기업법연구
2008 .06
-
미국헌법상 입법권을 둘러싼 행정부와 입법부의 관계 : 행정부와 입법부의 권력공유관계를 중심으로
한양법학
2014 .02
-
美國憲法上 聯邦議會의 權限과 그 限界
공법학연구
2005 .06
-
Befuddling Executive Power with Executive Unilateralism in the Unitary Executive
국제관계연구
2011 .03
-
미국헌법상 대통령의 법률집행의 의미
미국헌법연구
2007 .09
-
상법개정안상 집행임원제도 도입의무화에 대한 소고
강원법학
2014 .02
이 논문의 저자 정보
이 논문과 함께 이용한 논문
최근 본 자료
댓글(0)
0
UCI(KEPA) : I410-ECN-0101-2009-360-018446995