독도 영유권 문제는 한-일간 역사적ㆍ정치적(사실상의) 분쟁의 성격과 함께 ‘형식상’의 법적 분쟁의 성격 등 이중적 성격을 내포하고 있다. 법적 분쟁이라 함은 당사국간 실정 국제법 상 법적 권리 또는 이익에 관한 다툼이 있는 분쟁을 의미한다. 현행 국제법상 정치적 분쟁은 원칙적으로 사법적 심판의 대상에서 제외된다. 독도 문제가 단순한 ‘사실상의 분쟁’이 아니라 형식적으로나마 ‘법적 분쟁’의 양태(외양)를 가지고 있는 한, 비록 정치적 성격을 동시에 내포하고 있다고 하더라도 국제재판 성립가능성은 상존한다(수리적격 충족). 또 국제재판회부 가능성과 국제사법쟁송절차는 일차적으로 국제조약, 국제사법재판소 규정(ICJ Statute)과 재판소 규칙 그리고 2차적으로 동 재판소 및 상설국제사법재판소(PCIJ)의 판례를 참고하여 검토하여야 한다. 법적 분쟁이 국제사법재판소에 성공적으로 제소되기 위해서는 관할권과 수리적격(수리가능성)의 요건을 충족하여야 한다. 2가지 요건 중 하나라도 흠결이 있을 경우 피제소국은 재판소에 선결적 항변을 제기하여 문제의 제소의 각하 또는 기각을 청구할 수 있다. 수리적격의 요건 충족을 위해서는 무엇보다도 제소국의 법적 이익이 입증되어야 하며 또한 청구가 사실상 그리고 법률상 타당한 근거를 가져야 함이 요구된다. 또 ICJ 규정 상 동 재판소의 4가지 계쟁 관할권 가운데 우선 한-일 간 독도문제의 국제재판 회부를 위한 특별합의(서)의 채택은 거의 논외이며, 또 양국을 구속하는 국제연합헌장 및 기타 조약 상 재판회부의무 규정은 현재로서는 찾아보기 어렵다. 따라서 독도문제의 재판회부가능성과 관련하여 문제가 되는 ICJ의 관할권은 ICJ 규정 선택조항에 입각한 수락선언에 따라 성립하는 관할권과 소위 응소(확대)관할권 등 2가지라고 보여진다. 선택조항에 입각한 관할권 수락선언의 경우, 1984년 니카라과 사건에서 미국은 니카라과의 제소 움직임을 인지하고, 동 제소 불과 3일전 1946년 선언을 수정하는 새로운 선언(중앙 아메리카 관련 분쟁 배제)을 국제연합 사무총장에 기탁, 동 제소에 대한 ICJ의 관할권 흠결에 입각한 신청(제소) 각하를 시도하였으나, ICJ는 미국의 1946년 최초의 수락선언 내용 중 추후 수정선언은 통고 후 6개월 경과 후 발효한다는 조건을 이유로 미국의 주장을 기각하고 관할권을 확립한 후, 미국에 패소 판결을 내린 바 있다. 따라서 한국이 장차 ICJ 규정 선택조항상의 관할권 수락선언을 할 경우에는 일본 및 영국의 선언을 참고하여 독도문제를 관할권으로부터 배제하기 위한 명시적 유보를 행할 필요가 있다. 이는 일본의 독도문제 제소에 대한 유효한 선결적 항변을 제기할 수 있는 근거를 제공한다. 그러한 유보에는 명시적으로 일본과의 도서 영유권 및 해양경계획정 관련 이견에 대한 관할권 배제, 수락 선언 이전 발생 법적 분쟁의 배제, 선언 내용에 대한 추후 수정선언권, 추가적 유보권 및 통고 즉시 수락선언의 전부 또는 일부에 대한 효력 종료권 등을 유보한다는 내용을 포함하여야 한다. 응소관할권은 ICJ 규정 및 동 재판소 규칙에 입각, 콜퓨해협 사건에서 확립된 원칙으로서 독도문제가 만일 한-일간 무력충돌로 비화, 안보리의 ICJ 회부 권고 결의가 채택되는 가상적 상황이 발생할 경우와 관련하여 문제시될 수 있다. 평화적ㆍ지속적ㆍ실효적 지배의 現狀을 유지하는 것이 중요한 이유가 여기에 있다. 동시에 독도에 대한 일본의 집요한 ‘분쟁’ 지역화 시도에 대하여서는 국가실행의 측면에서 일부 제한된 범위 내에서 적극적 대응도 필요하다고 생각된다. 아울러 분쟁의 평화적 해결이라는 시대정신과 법적 요구에 비추어 독도문제에 대한 영유권의 보전ㆍ강화에 관한 실정 국제법에 대한 연구에 못지않게, 독도 문제가 국제재판소에 회부되는 경우에 대비한 국제사법쟁송절차에 대한 연구 역시 매우 중요하고 절실하다.
The offshore Korean islets of Dokdo(Tokto) are comprised of a pair of volcanic elevations plus dozens of even smaller outcroppings in the semi-enclosed East Sea (Sea of Japan). Identified historically as Usan-do, Sambong-do(Three-Peak Islets) or Seok-do(Stone Islets), the two main steep, rugged rocks, some 110-160 meters apart, are situated 87-89 kilometers southeastwards from Korea's Ullungdo(Dagelet) and some 160 kilometers northwestwards from Japan's Oki Islands. As evidenced by historical and official records from both countries, ancient and modern, Dokdo has been peacefully and effectively occupied, administered and ruled by the successive Korean governments for at least 1,500 years up until now, a hard fact hardly opposable by Japan. Such an actual. peaceful and continuous display of state authority was once forced into interruption during the relatively brief interregnum between 1910 and 1945 when the then imperialist, militaristic Japan swallowed up the entire Korean peninsula to enforce a draconian colonial rule. Since 1952, however, Japan has been intent to advance a persistent argument that it "discovered" the islets as terra (res) nullius to "incorporate" it in 1905 during the Russo-Japanese War as part of Shimane Prefecture's territory. The clandestine "incorporation" was thus simply a prelude to the impending annexation of Korea. And as outlined, authentic documents would prima facie establish that in no time of written history has Dokdo been subjected to the legal regime for 'no-man's lands', nor has or could have Japan exercised or established de facto or de jure sovereignty over Dokdo. It is, therefore, only too fair for Dokdo, otherwise known in the West as Liancourt Rocks, to have reverted to Korea after Japan's surrender in 1945 and Korea's subsequent independence. A fresh controversy, however, flared up in February 2005 when Shimane Prefecture passed a bill designating Feb. 22 as Takeshima Day, marking the alleged centennial of its unilateral, furtive act of "incorporation" accompanied by neither proclamation nor notification to the Chosun government. So, does there really exist a legal, as opposed to a political, dispute stricto sensu, over Dokdo? To wit, is such a surreptitious Japanese act of "incorporation" alone, neither published publicly nor followed by peaceful occupation, sufficient to stake out a valid claim? And if so, does Japan stand a reasonable chance of taking the matter successfully before the ICJ? As such, like it or not, Korea should come to terms with this annoying. unpleasant, and even daunting situation. The classic definition of a 'dispute' was given in 1924 by the PCIJ, followed by the ICJ, as a "disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or interests between parties". This may well be the authentic legal definition of a de facto dispute but not necessarily concern the definition of a 'legal dispute' as such. By a de facto dispute is meant a political dispute with no legal right or interest involved or contested. Analytically and arguably, the Dokdo question is possessed with a dual attribute: political and legal. In order for a de facto dispute to be eligible for a legal and justiciable dispute, the applicant State must contest legal rights or interests protected under international agreements but allegedly affected adversely or infringed upon by the wrongful acts (breach of obligations) of the respondent State. From this perspective, since both contend for their own legal title or right to the two sister rocks, the Dokdo controversy may arguably be termed a pro forma legal dispute. A legal dispute qua legal dispute must then satisfy two requirements as the gateway to successful application before the ICJ: jurisdiction and admissibility. The determination of jurisdiction may only be settled or resolved by the ICJ through a decision. Admissibility requires, inter alia, the existence of a legal dispute and a proper claim. Despite its flimsy claims to the volcanic bumps. Japan would be tempted to trumpet the allegedly 'disputed' nature to the world at large to orchestrate an ultimate submission of the Dokdo case for international adjudication. Turning to the four bases of the ICJs contentious jurisdiction as established under Arts. 36 and 40 of the ICJ Statute, Rules of the Court, and its jurisprudence, it is almost out of the question for the Korean government to enter into a special agreement (compromis) with Japan to refer the Dokdo question to the ICJ. Compromissory clauses under relevant treaties are not in sight. The two remaining bases on which to found the ICJ jurisdiction merit a closer examination: jurisdiction established under the Optional Clause and forum prorogatum. In the 1984 Nicaragua Case, an unforeseeable but apparent oversight emerged from the 1946 U.S. acceptance of the ICJ jurisdiction under the Optional Clause when the former successfully seized the ICJ of its case. The blunder dealt an indelible legal and political disaster to America in the merits phase. The 1946 U.S. Declaration had been worded to allow it to "remain in force for a period of five years and thereafter until the expiration of six months after notice may be given to terminate this declaration". Recognizing the irreversible slip belatedly, the U.S. side, just three days before Nicaragua filed an application on April 9, 1984, deposited with the U.N. Secretary General a notification to preclude with immediate effect "disputes with any Central American State or arising out of or related to events in Central America" for the subsequent two years. This partial and temporary withdrawal attempt failed to militate against the Nicaraguan action. The six months' notice proviso acted as the very causa sine qua non of the U.S. fiasco. Given the necessary cause of the American calamity in the Nicaragua Case, it is absolutely necessary and important that Korea take a leaf out of the British declaration or the Japanese declaration of Sept. 15, 1958. Thus, it may accept as compulsory the ICJ jurisdiction under the Optional Clause until such time as notice may be given to terminate the acceptance. over all disputes arising after the date of the present declaration, other than any disagreement with Japan over insular land territory or maritime boundary delimitation. Furthermore, when depositing any such a declaration, Korea should also restrict the temporal, personal, geographical and material scope of its application by reserving, expressly and with immediate effect as from the moment of such notification, the right of amending, modifying, revising or withdrawing any of the foregoing reservations, and the right of adding new conditions or reservations. These precautions will provide a sound and solid basis for preliminary objection, if application should ever be brought by Japan. Even trickier and more treacherous to cope with in the Dokdo context than the jurisdiction exercisable under the Optional Clause is forum prorogatum, as established in the 1948 Corfu Channel Case. This is because potentially inflammable national sentiments or resentment on both sides of the Korea Straits might combine to fuel confrontation or even armed conflict, leading to a Security Council recommendation exhorting the parties to submit the disagreement to the ICJ. Any military confrontation may also trigger a request by the Security Council or General Assembly for an advisory opinion from the ICJ, which, notwithstanding the lack of any binding force, has been regarded as wielding powerful persuasive authority and respected widely as such by states and international organizations. Here lies the importance of exercising prudence in maintaining the status quo, i.e. peaceful, continued and effective possession. Overall, something of an anathema is over-confidence in the patent or material impossibility of Dokdo ownership being legally challenged or contested in the absence of special agreement. The substantive law regulating the existence, preservation and consolidation of a title or right is simply entwined with the procedural law governing its effective claim or defence in legal proceedings. A balanced approach to both areas of international law to flesh out and consolidate Korea's historic title would help scuttle Japanese chances of snatching at the islets from Korean hands. At the same time, state practice or subsequent conduct should be taken seriously. Diplomatic correspondence or exchange of notes indicating agreement on judicial settlement, as in the 1973 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, or any conduct implying acquiescence in the 'disputed' nature of Dokdo sovereignty would not only prejudice Korean title and get the Dokdo status into trouble, but may be invoked by Japan as a token of consent to, or as a justification for international adjudication.